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Introduction 
 
This thesis is a research study concerned with the accounting issues of the 
consolidation of interests in Joint Controlled Entities (here after JCEs). 
The main  purpose of the thesis is to observe the accounting convergence for the 
consolidation of interests in JCEs using the Equity method or the Proportionate 
consolidation and to investigate the factors that influence managers’ decision to 
reporting one of the two alternative methods. These goals are addressed through 
the implementation of different methodologies as well as of multiple theoretical 
frameworks. 
Starting from 2005, with the mandatory introduction of the International 
Accounting Standard (IAS), all the companies adopting such principles have been 
applying IAS 31 for the accounting of interests in JCEs. The International 
Standards allows the recognition of investments held in JCEs, in the venturer 
financial statement, through one of the two methods between Equity method or 
the Proportionate consolidation. The impact on venturer financial statement will 
be different according to the accounting method chosen. In particular, under the 
Equity method an interest in a JCEs is initially recorded at cost and thereafter 
adjusted for the post-acquisition change in the venturer’s share of net assets of the 
JCEs. Otherwise, under the Proportionate method a venturer’s share of each of the 
assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses of a JCEs is combined line by line with 
similar items in the venturer’s financial statements or reported as separate line 
items in the venturer’s financial statements. Although both methods do not affect 
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venturer’s net income, retained earnings and shareholders equity, they have a 
relevant impact in terms of components displayed in consolidated accounts.  
Empirical findings confirm and reveal that when the International Accounting 
Standards offering multiple options for the valuation of the same items decrease 
the convergence among financial statements. (Mechelli, 2009; Morais &  Curto, 
2009).  The accounting choice literature (Fields et al., 2001), instead, suggests 
that, in the agency costs framework,  the accounting choice is determined to 
influence firms’s contractual arrangements, including executive compensation 
agreements and debt covenants, ex-post the choice may be made to increase 
compensation or avoid the covenant violation, with various objectives, as the 
contractual motivation, the internal agency conflict-executive compensation, the 
managerial opportunism, the external agency conflict- bond covenants. 
This background makes this thesis particularly appealing since the consolidation of 
interests in JCEs raises a relevant problem of harmonization and comparability, 
with both conceptual and operational implications and incentives to investigate the 
determinants of the managers’ decision to reporting  Equity or Proportionate.  
Moreover, the reporting of JCEs, has always been a controversial accounting issue 
among scholars, practitioners and regulators.  Overall literature on the topic raises 
several questions in terms of which are the market consequences deriving from the 
alternative reporting method (Kothavala, 2003; Lim et al., 2003; Graham et al., 
2003; Stoltzfus & Epps, 2005; Soonawalla, 2006; Bauman, 2007)  differently, 
relatively little attention has been dedicated to the determinants for the accounting 
treatments of JCEs (Lourenço & Curto, 2010; Giner & Veron, 2012). 
The relevance and the timeliness of the topic are witnessed by the recent issue of 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standard) 11, Joint Arrangements, which 
Introduction 
3 
 
removes the multiple accounting options, in prescribing merely the Equity 
method. The IASB (International Accounting standard Board) aims to increase 
comparability within IFRS and convergence with US GAAP. The recently issued 
IFRS 11 is a reflection of the role played by the JCEs on the global markets and 
extensively within the entire economic system. 
The study is conducted in the Italian market, as some of its features make it a 
setting specifically suitable. First, a previous study observed a medium level of 
comparability among Italian consolidated financial statements in the reporting of 
JCEs (Catuogno & Allini, 2011). Second, there is a need for more accounting choice 
studies, and specifically those on JCEs, for countries characterized by 
predominance of small and medium size listed companies, concentrated ownership 
and debt financing as the main source of capital (Di Pietra et al., 2008). Third, Italy 
may be considered as representative of a family business environment in which family 
members play a relevant role in ownership, management and board composition 
(Miller et al., 2013). 
This thesis fits in the research stream of the accounting choices,  that considers the 
firms rational and that the accounting information produces economics effects. As 
consequences the managers are not indifferent to the accounting method selected. 
The study is structured in three chapters: 
 Theoretical aspects of the JCEs; 
 Joint Controlled Entities: comparability in a multiple accounting choices. 
Evidences from Italian setting; 
 Behind the Equity method for Interests in JCE. 
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Each chapter is structured as a specific research design,  in terms of research question, 
methodology and theoretical approach, but  the overall research design has been 
represented as a whole.  
The first chapter aims to describe, the features of the JCEs, as a technical 
instruments, and the theoretical aspects that may help to explain the reasons that 
incentive companies to recur to this instruments, and summarizes the main 
empirical evidences on this topic.  
Firstly a review of the principal studies on JCEs is conducted  in order to identify 
the principal theoretical and empirical directions.  In the literature, three 
theoretical approaches are used to explain the motivation and the choice of JCEs: 
the Theory of Transaction Costs (Williamson, 1975,1985); Strategic Behavior 
Theory (Kogut, 1989); Organizational Knowledge and Learning Theory (Polanyi,  
1967).  
Secondly, the JCEs accounting issue is faced, in particular, the convergence 
process steps for their accounting treatment. Until 2005 the Italian regulation 
(Legislative Decree n. 127/1991 art. 33) established the application of the Equity 
method if the company not consolidated the JCEs, and the Proportionate method 
for the consolidation of JCEs. Starting from 2005,  the IAS 31 has required the 
application of two alternatives accounting method: Equity or Proportionate. Since 
the Board considered the multiple evaluation options allowed by IAS 31 as an 
impediment to high quality reporting of joint arrangements and in order to reduce 
differences between IFRS and US GAAP, it was necessary a project to replace IAS 
31, with the aims to provide more transparent and relevant financial information 
for the investors and creditors. As a result, the IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements was 
published in 2011 by the IASB as part of its new suite of consolidation and related 
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standards, also replacing existing requirements for subsidiaries. The new standard 
prescribes the only application of Equity Method starting from 2014.  
The chapter ends with a summary of previous empirical findings on  JCEs, divided 
into two broad categories:  Effects and Determinants of the use of Equity or 
Proportionate. 
The second chapter focuses on the accounting converge for the reporting of 
interests in JCEs using the Equity method or the Proportionate consolidation 
under the IAS 31, and explores the determinants that could affect the 
management’s accounting choice. After measuring convergence, the research 
intends to observe if the market is indirectly affects by the lack of accounting 
convergence practice and rewards firms applying Equity method with better key 
performance indicators. 
The research employs an exploratory research design. To measure the convergence 
for the consolidation of the interests in JCEs is used the van der Tas Herfindahl H 
index, since it is particularly suitable for the measurement of the comparability 
within one country (van der Tas, 1988). Subsequently is  observed the Price 
Earning distribution - as a measure of firm’s investors reputation - associated with 
the application of each accounting method required by IAS 31 (Darryl et al.,1987). 
Finally is adopted an exploratory research design, the  Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA), (Ghauri et al., 1995) based on two parameters, Price/Earnings (as a 
measure of firm’s investors reputation) (Little, 1999) and  method of consolidation 
for JCEs (Equity or Proportionate) with the aim to  investigate the existence of latent 
variables that could explain the accounting choices for the consolidation of JCEs.  
The third chapter is framed in the contracting-based theory, coherently with 
previous studies on the accounting choices determinants (Missonier-Piera, 2004; 
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Astami & Tower, 2006; Quagli & Avallone, 2010; Waweru et al., 2011) and aims at 
investigating factors that influence managers’ decision to use the Equity method 
for the accounting of JCEs under IAS 31.  
The opportunistic view suggests that managers choose accounting policies for their 
own benefit which depends on debt covenants, political costs and bonus plans 
(Watts & Zimmerman 1978; 1986; Holthausen, 1990).  Since the Equity method 
results in a performance-improving accounting technique while the Proportionate 
consolidation represents a performance-decreasing accounting technique for the 
venturer, the analysis aims to  show that contractual efficiency and managerial 
opportunism drive the Equity method choice.This research employs a quantitative 
method and the hypotheses are tested by using a mixed-effects logistic model. 
The resulting findings are interpreted in light of theoretical frameworks as well as 
of peculiarities of the context. 
 
I would like to thank Simona Catuogno, University of Naples “Federico II” and 
Alessandra Allini, University of Naples “Federico II”, my co-authors for the 
researches conducted in the Chapter 2 and in the Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 1 
Theorical aspects of the JCEs 
 
 
 
1.Introduction  
 
The Joint Controlled Entities are one of the most used forms of enterprise set up to 
achieve a strategic alliance. 
In the current context of a globalized economy and formalization of the strategic 
agreements the JCEs represent a tool of enterprise flexible, allowing to quickly 
deal the technological change in the competitive markets and to achieve the 
strategic objectives of the enterprise. In particular the JCEs are a useful tool set up 
to start a process of internationalization or in a logic of reduction of transaction 
costs. 
In its most traditional definition the JCEs are firms jointly controlled by two or 
more separate entities, which retain their legal and economic autonomy. 
The uniqueness and complexity of the instrument requires an in-depth knowledge 
of the economic reality underlying the alliance.  
In this first introductory chapter, will be analyze briefly, the figure of the JCEs, as 
technical instrument, and the theoretical aspects that may help to explain the 
reasons that incentive companies to recur to this instrument. 
Finally, the accounting issue will be also reviewed. 
The JCEs, or jointly controlled entity, are defined as agreements between two or 
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more parties, also called venturers, who share investments, capabilities, time, 
knowledge and other resources,to implement a particular project or to constitute 
an separately entity. The agreement qualifies the common interest and determines 
the sharing of profits and losses. 
At an organizational level, this type of agreement originates from associative 
relationships, known in the English commercial practice since the early Middle 
Ages. 
From a legal perspective, however, the JCEs have US origins. In fact, the aim of 
many of the members of the Negotiated Acquisitions Committee of the Business 
Law Section of Washington DC was the formalization of this model. The members 
worked on the preparation of an archetype of the JCEs agreement from the spring 
of 1994, giving rise to an evolutionary trend towards the modelling of the contract. 
Currently, the JCEs represent an intermediate tool, that allows enterprises to 
achieve both the need for organizational independence, and the need to cooperate 
and share resources in order to create a competitive advantage. 
In academic context, several definitions have been given to this kind of instrument. 
Among the main important is worth to remind the Friedmann and Kalmanoff 
definition (1961): “the JCEs are partnerships between companies, involving a 
collaboration for a period of time not limited”, that one of Sciarelli (1973), “In a 
JCEs all participants have benefits by the association of their technical resources, 
financial and otherwise”, and, according to Hall (1984), “a JCEs can be any type of 
agreement by which two or more parties come together and combine resources to 
fulfill a specific economic goal”. 
Thanks to a joint analysis of academic definitions, it is possible to draw a number 
of elements that seem to recur constantly in these agreements: 
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 The will of a jointly agreement of the partners; 
 The joint of interest; 
 The integration of resources; 
 The retention of the operational and legal autonomy of the co-venturers; 
 The division of the shares held by the partner companies; 
 The active role played by the participants to the agreement; 
 The division of income, expenses, profits and losses resulting from the 
common control. 
 
2. JCEs taxonomy 
 
The definition of JCEs, given above, reflect the point of view used to describe the 
agreement. These different definitions give rise to different types of agreements 
(Ferrari & Montanari, 2012).  
There are several configurations based upon the JCEs peculiarities. The most 
important distinction, for practical purposes, considering the legal nature of the 
relationship as the focal point, is the difference between Equity and non-Equity 
JCEs (or Contractual JCEs). 
The first involves the formation of a new company, whereas the second envisages 
the ratification of an agreement in order to achieve common goals. 
It is important to emphasize that the choice between the two types is run to the 
needs for more or less flexibility and different types of targets, such as, for example 
(i) a long-term collaboration or (ii) the achievement of a specific and 
predetermined goal. Sometimes, this choice is conditioned by national regulations. 
Taking into account the object underlying the agreement it is possible to come up 
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with a differentiation between “operational” and “instrumental” JCEs. 
The firsts are referred to durable agreements, involving the performance of critical 
activities, or that pursue long-term goals unreachable without no specific 
collaborations.  
The seconds have a predetermined duration, an occasional nature and finish with 
the achievement of the purpose for which they were established. 
Additionally we consider the participants to the agreement, and we can distinguish 
between JCEs of first and second degree. In the first case, each venturer is 
represented by a single firm. In the second case each venturer is the expression of a 
group of companies, which, however, want to participate in this agreement as if 
they were a single component. This second type is certainly very useful for small 
and medium enterprises, as joining themselves into each other, they can reach the 
size threshold, to participate in an agreement, or at least obtain a greater 
contractual power. 
Depending on the industry in which the JCEs will operate, we distinguish 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate JCEs. This distinction is based upon  the 
sector in which the venturers operate. The horizontal JCEs operate in the same 
sector of the venturers, the venturers and the JCEs have the same strategic 
activities. In the vertical agreements the JCEs activities are in a stage of the 
venturer product process, the conglomerate JCEs operate in new sector, unknown 
for the venturer. 
Based upon the equity share held by each venturer we can distinguish between 
equal and not equal JCEs. In the first case, the amount of capital owned by every 
participant is equal, unlike in the second one. This discriminant is erroneously 
associated with the degree of control within the agreement but, in reality, there is 
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no direct correspondence between the amount of equity held and right control. 
There are several cases which the minority shareholders obtain control of the JCEs 
due to specific managerial and/or superior capabilities. 
Based upon the degree of management influence, we can distinguish the JCEs in 
dominant and shared. In the first case a partner assumes a “dominant” role in 
making strategic and managerial decisions, in the second one, all partners 
contribute equally to the formation of these policies. 
Finally, on the basis of the nationality of the venturers, we can distinguish the 
JCEs in domestic and international, depending on whether or not the partners 
belong to the same country. 
The definition of this type of agreement and its various facets, allow us to 
understand how, through it,  is possible a combination of resources and 
capabilities that make the total value generate by the agreement greater than the 
sum of the individual firms benefits. This allow to achieve mutual benefits and 
synergies, which are the main factors leading to establishment of a JCEs.  
 
3. Theories on JCEs  
 
The JCEs are important alternative to contracting, acquisition and international 
development, but the literature has not in-depth and analyzed, hence the study of 
the JCEs has attracted a relevant interest in the main press and academic literature 
(Friedman 1961; Hladik 1985).   
This section provides a review of the principal studies on JCEs in order to identify 
the principal theoretical and empirical directions. 
In the theory the JCEs are perceived as an instrument of organizational learning, 
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and are used for the transfer of organizationally embedded knowledge which 
cannot planned easily or imply high market transactions (Kogout, 1988). 
The JCEs occur when two or more companies share a portion of their resources 
within a common legal structure. Such definition views the JCEs as a selection 
among alternative way by which two or more companies can transact. Is important 
to find a theory that can explain why this agreement is chosen over such 
alternatives as acquisition, supply contract, licensing or market purchases (Berg & 
Friedman, 1980). 
In the literature three theoretical approaches are used to explain the motivation 
and the choice of JCEs: 
1) The theory of transaction costs ( Williamson, 1975,1985); 
2) Strategic behavior; 
3) Organizational Knowledge and learning. 
 
Transaction costs 
 
The transaction costs referred to JCEs involves the question of how firms should 
organize its activities with other companies. 
According to Williamson, the firms choose to how the transact to minimize the 
sum of production and transaction costs. Production costs differ between 
companies in relation to the scale of operations, to learning, or the ownership 
knowledge. The principal aspects of high transaction costs between arms- length 
parties is small numbers bargaining in a bilateral governance (Williamson, 1975). 
There are a small numbers bargaining when a switching costs are due to asset 
specificity, like the degree to which assets are specialized to support trade between 
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only a few parties (Kogut, 1988).The evidence of the Williamson’s analysis is that a 
company can choose to produce a component although its production costs are 
higher than what outside suppliers incur. A decision may be optimal if the 
transaction costs outweigh the production saving. 
A necessary condition to prefer the JCEs to internal development or acquisition, is 
that the production costs achieved through this structures are very higher that 
external sourcing for at least one of the partners. 
The transaction cost theory must explain what discriminates the JCEs  from a 
contract. Two elements are distinctive:  a) joint ownership control and rights, b) 
the mutual commitments of resources. The JCEs are the best organizational  
structure when occurs a high uncertainty over specifying and monitoring 
performance, and in relation to the degree of asset specificity. The uncertain plays 
a significant role in encouraging the JCEs over a contract. The JCEs mitigate the 
uncertain when represent a vertical investment for one party and a horizontal for 
the other, since replace a supply agreement. The hazards represents the problem of 
how an agreement is used to divide excess profits, defined as “appropriability” 
problem. The JCEs resolve this issue since represent a superior monitoring 
mechanism and alignment of incentives to reveal information, share technologies  
and guarantee performance. Is possible to alignment the incentives sharing costs 
and/or profits and the mutual investments in dedicated assets. In this way, both 
venturer gain or lose the performance of the venture (Kogut, 1988 pag. 321). 
According to Alchian (1950), the competition among different forms of institutions 
leads to the survival of those most cost-productive forms. These forms can occur 
via the marketplace or by the inclusion of activities within a firm, depending on 
which arrangement is more cost effective (Coase 1937; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
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Firms that organize themselves to minimize transaction costs are more likely to 
survive (Fama & Jensen 1983).  
Scholars argue that when the market acquisition costs or the post- acquisition 
costs are significant, the JCEs can represent the most efficient form of 
organizational agreement, since the mutual task is pursued inside the venturers’ 
firms (Hennart, 1991; Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Hennart & Reddy 1997; Chen & 
Hennart, 2004). 
The Hennart study(1988) is considered the first contribute that uses the 
Transaction costs theory to explain organizational structures as the JCEs. The 
author identifies two type of JCEs, scale and link.  According: “Scale JCEs are 
created when two or more firms enter together a contiguous stage of production or 
distribution or a new market”. The main  feature of these venturers is that they 
result from similar moves by all the parents: forward or backward vertical 
integration, horizontal expansion, or diversification, “in the Link JCEs the position 
of the partners is not symmetrical, the JCEs may constitute a vertical investments 
for one of the parties and a diversification for the other”.  Scale JCEs allow firms to 
reconcile the need to bridge a failing market with the presence of a large 
differences efficient scales across successive stages; link JCEs are created to 
remedy the simultaneous failure of at least two market.  
Considering above the JCEs are used as a strategic tool helping companies to 
achieve specific goals, reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1991). 
 
Strategic behavior 
 
Other explanation for the creation of JCEs derives from theory on how strategic 
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behavior affects the competitive positioning of the company. The main difference 
between the Transaction costs theory and Strategic behavior Theory is in the 
objectives attributed to firms. The first, argues that companies transact to 
maximizes the sum of production and transaction costs, the second, argues that 
companies transact to maximizes profits through improving a firm’s competitive 
position facing the rivals. In particular, the strategic behavior, explains how 
competitive positioning influences the asset value of the firms while the 
transaction costs defines the costs specific to a particular exchange (Kogut, 1989)  
Under this perspective the creation of the JCEs avoid the costly duplication among 
companies but preserve the competition generating a welfare- improving.   In 
many case a JCEs are used as an instrument to deter entry or erode  competitors’ 
positions. Vickers (1985) describes the JCEs as a defensive investment by which 
companies hedge against strategic uncertainty, especially in sectors of moderate 
concentration.  The strategic behavior suggests that the venturer will be chosen to 
improve the competitive positioning of the parties.  
We can conclude that respect to transaction costs theory, the identification of the 
motives to cooperate and  the venurer’s selection, are more relevant under the 
strategic approach.  
 
Organizational Knowledge and learning 
 
Both transaction and strategic behavior theory provide an satisfactory economic 
reason to explain the creation of JCEs. The JCEs are a means by which companies 
learn or retain their knowledge, under this perspective, are a vehicles by which 
tacit knowledge is transferred (Polanyi,  1967).  Unlike the transaction costs theory, 
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other forms of transfer, (such as licensing), are not considered,  because the very 
knowledge being transferred is organizationally embedded.  
In the transaction costs theory a JCEs are proposed if neither venturer owns each 
other’s technology, conversely following Winter (1982) a firm may decide to JCEs 
in order to retain  the capabilities (“remember by doing”) of organizing a particular 
activity  while benefitting from the superior production techniques of a partner. 
The company can choose a more costly JCEs to exploit the capability in the future. 
The JCEs are driven, in this context, by the difference in the value of options to 
explore future opportunities. In summary a JCEs is preferred if one or both 
companies intend to acquire  the others organizational know-how, or one firm 
intend to maintain an organizational capability while benefitting from another 
firm’s current knowledge or costs advantage. 
The three perspective analyzed provide different explanation to encourages a JCEs. 
The transaction costs theory views the JCEs as an efficient solution to the hazards 
of economics transactions. 
Strategic behavior views the JCEs as an enhance market power in a context of a 
competitive rivalry. 
The organizational knowledge and learning views the JCEs as an instrument by 
which organizational knowledge is exchanged and imitated. 
 
4. Strategic aspects of JCEs  
 
Few studies have analyzed how the dimensions of the JCEs strategies should vary 
under different competitive circumstances. The diverse industry conditions make 
JCEs more or less appropriate as a competitive strategy alterative, in particular the 
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JCEs can exacerbate the competition,  stabilize profit levels or motivate structural 
changes in vertical integration; hence the managers must examine how they might 
best use JCEs, especially if other cooperative strategies are being used with 
increasing frequency (Harrigan, 1988).  
Harrigan (1985), identified four key dimensions of JCEs strategies in a framework 
of alternative strategies: 
1) The form of business units’ cooperative ventures (shared- equity, non-
equity arrangements); 
2) The focus of cooperative strategies pursued by ventures’ sponsoring firms to 
industry features in the venture’s competitive conditions; 
3)  The venture’s need for operating autonomy from its sponsoring companies’ 
activities is also related to these industry traits; 
4) Venture’s duration is related to competitive behavior within the venture’s 
industry. 
The elements to consider when formulating cooperative strategies are: i) demand 
uncertainty, ii) customer features, iii) infrastructure development, iv) production 
technology, v) the volatility of competitive behavior, vi) the nature and the extent 
of linkages between the venture and its owners.  
These six key traits can be classified in two effects: demand traits (that suggest the 
need for cooperative strategy, and competitive traits (that suggest how firms will 
respond  to the need for cooperation in a particular industry environment). 
The effective JCEs strategies must consider the forces of these key traits which 
affects the four dimensions above (Beamish, 1984) 
The studies on demand traits indicate how long a market opportunity may be 
expected to remain attractive, the firms can use the JCEs if the opportunities in 
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some markets are short-lived, since using a JCEs is possible to entry in these 
growing markets to exploit them before their possible decline. Demand  must be 
attractive to justify  firms’ investments, whether through a JCEs or by going it 
alone. The key demand traits include demand uncertainty, customer features, 
production technology. 
The studies on competitive traits suggest how firms respond to the need for 
cooperation  that exist  in various type of markets. The key competitive traits 
include the volatility of competitive behavior, infrastructure development the 
nature and the extent of linkages between the venture and its owners. 
Competitor aspects reflect the actions that companies undertake to satisfy 
customer demands. These actions affect their decisions about: 
 Competitive behavior; 
 Capital intensive; 
 Strategic posture; 
 Relationship that compose industry  infrastructure; 
 Technological scale, in terms of frequency of changes  in technology. 
 
5. Accounting convergence process in Italy  
 
In the context of a globalized economy, the corporate disclosure have to be 
adequate, considering the active rule of the investors in the international capital 
market.  
Taking into account of the actual developments of the markets, the European 
Union legislation states that the financial statements, both individual and 
consolidated, must to provide a “true” and “fair” view of the financial statement 
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position and of the net income of the group. 
Hence, an economic entity, which can be a group of companies, is forced to 
become transparent with respect to a range of stakeholders belonging to different 
countries, in order to guarantee the quality of the investors’ decision making 
process. 
In this context appears clear the importance and sensitivity of an international 
comparability process (Ferrari & Montanari, 2012). Comparability is a 
characteristic of the accounting disclosure which allows financial statement users 
to be able to recognize the differences among companies, without taking into 
consideration that these differences could come from the specificities of the 
accounting rules. 
In the intention of the European Legislator, the harmonization process should 
have led to comparability of annual reports in countries belonging to the European 
Union. Although European countries with heterogeneous accounting traditions 
have been invited to use the same set of principles when drawing up financial 
statements, still is possible to observe institutional, social, cultural and 
environmental differences in various geographic areas. The mandatory application 
of the same set of accounting rules, the “Jure” harmonization, does not necessarily 
lead to harmonization in the accounting practices, because, as stated above, 
companies could still choose divergent accounting behaviors, especially in the case 
of standards that offer multiple options for the valuation of the same items, each of 
which is compliant with the standard (Land & Lang, 2002). Consequently, the 
pursuing of harmonization, and hence comparability, is entrusted to the standard 
setting process, as well as to the practical application of the standards themselves 
(Rahman et al., 2002; Thorsten & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; Jagannath & 
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Nanjegowda, 2008; Paananen & Henghsiu, 2009). However, the standard setting 
process aims to increase the compliance between regulations and accounting 
practices by means of de jure harmonization, the de facto harmonization takes 
place when the accounting behaviors converge, even if the accounting regulation 
allows multiple evaluation options. While standard setters are mainly concerned 
with de jure harmonization, users of financial statements benefit most from de 
facto harmonization.  
The accounting harmonization produces several benefits (Montrone, 2009), for 
example in those countries where an adequate level of codification of accounting 
standards is not achieved, the reference to existing and accepted standard 
eliminates the cost and time of finding of new principles; makes the international 
transactions easier, which, in the current context, are extremely frequent; makes 
the capital market more efficient, finally the firms can obtain more easily 
internationally funds, being the information reliable and comparable even for 
foreign investors. 
 
Consolidation of interests in JCE 
 
Contrary to the other countries, where the preparation of consolidated financial 
statements has been taken place since a long time, in Italy, this topic has always 
received limited attention. The lack of focusing on this issue has lasted until the 
adoption of the Legislative Decree n. 127/1991 art. 33 (Montrone, 2009). The 
Legislative Decree has established that the limited companies, partnership limited 
by shares and limited liability companies that exercising a control over an entity 
must to prepare the consolidated financial statement in accordance to the rules 
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laid down by the Decree. As consequence, for the first time, in 1991, with the 
introduction of the Decree, the proportionate consolidation method was explicitly 
prescribed for JCEs. Until the middle of the last century, this method was adopted 
extensively for all subsidiaries included in the consolidation (not just those under 
joint control), consistently with the provisions of the Theory of Property (Andrei et 
al. 2011).1  
Fifteen years later, according to the communication n. 508/95/CEE, “Accounting 
harmonization: a new strategy towards the international harmonization”, the 
European Commission finally chose the International Accounting Standards 
principles as accounting base for the continental companies. The  International 
Accounting Standard  are issued by a group of accounting professionals, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), since 1973. The IASC has 
acted, until 2001, as an internal committee of the world organization of  the 
professional accountants, to become, then, a private foundation of US law (IASC 
Foundation). Within this foundation, there a structure with the responsibility for 
issuing accounting standards, namely the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB).  
The principles, issued by this organism, are now called International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and replace the previous International Accounting 
Standard; anyway the general framework refers to the international accounting 
that is labeled IAS/IFRS. 
Among the principles endorsed, we analyze, for the purpose of this thesis the IAS 
31, “Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures”. Under IAS 31 the control 
                                                   
1 This theory, originated in Anglo-Saxon countries, identifies the group as a mere offshoot of the parent company, created 
through investments in other companies. The consolidated financial statements, therefore, is considered as an extension of 
the parent company. 
 
Chapter 1.Theoretical aspects of JCEs 
22 
 
is defined as the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity in 
order to obtain benefits. The joint venture is defined as a “contractual arrangement 
whereby two or more parties undertake an economic activity subject to joint 
control”, where the “joint control” is the contractually agreed sharing of control 
over an economic activity and exists only when financial decisions, management 
and strategic, on the business, require the unanimous consent of the participants. 
Concerning to the fields of application of the principle, it should be applied for the 
accounting of investments in joint ventures and for the reporting of assets, 
liabilities, income and expenses of the joint ventures in the financial statements of 
the participants and investors, regardless of structures or the manner in which the 
operations of the joint venture activities take place. 
In summary, regardless of the exclusions, IAS 31 distinguishes three different 
types of joint ventures: 
1) Jointly controlled operations; 
2) Jointly controlled assets; 
3) Jointly controlled entities. 
All types have a common basis, the venturers are bound by a contractual 
agreement and this agreement establishes joint control. The contractual 
arrangement is the distinctive feature of the joint venture, because, without it, the 
participation would be classified as an investment subject to significant influence 
(IAS 28). Thus, the presence of the contractual agreement is critical for the 
application of IAS 31. 
The “jointly controlled operations”, are set up to allow the use of assets and other 
resources of the participants, rather than the establishment of a new entity. Each 
venturer uses its own property, plant, equipment and manages its inventories, 
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costs and liabilities,  can capture new funding, where will be solely responsible. 
The contractual arrangement defines the allocation of revenue from sale of the 
joint product and any expenses incurred. 
The venturer should recognizes in its financial statements the assets subject to 
control, the liabilities and expenses that he incurs and, finally, the share of income 
earned. 
For this type of joint venture is not expected to draw up a specific financial 
statement, but only an internal reporting is required in order to establish the 
economic performance of the venture. 
The second type of joint venture, the “jointly controlled assets”, are defined as an 
agreement of control or of joint ownership, by the venturers of one or more assets 
invested to the venture.  
These assets are used to obtain economic benefits. Each participant has, therefore, 
control over its share of future economic benefits through the ownership share of 
the jointly controlled assets. 
Each participant shall recognizes in its financial statements: 
 The share of the jointly controlled assets; 
 Any liability incurred; 
 The share of liabilities incurred, tackled jointly with partners; 
 The share of revenue from the sale or use of the products of the venture; 
 Any cost incurred in respect of its interest in the jointly controlled assets. 
The accounting treatment of jointly controlled assets reflects the substance and 
economic reality.  
Also in this case for the jointly controlled assets, it is not required the preparation 
of the financial statements, although management accounts may be predisposed. 
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The joint controlled entities are the most widespread form of jointly agreement. 
These consist in the creation of an entity, a partnership or other entity, subject to 
joint control. These are independent in making operational decisions, but  their 
choices are based upon the contractual agreement that is the basis. 
This entities control the assets covered by the agreement, support  liabilities, 
expenses and earns income. Also, can access funding of which will be solely 
responsible. Each venture entitled to a share of the results of the entity. 
This structure is required to prepare financial statements in accordance with IAS 
31. 
The participants, can recognize the participation through one of two alternative 
methods, equity or proportionate method.  
According to the proportionate consolidation, the value of the investments is offset 
only with the portion of equity attributable to the group, not disclosing, so, the 
items "Minority interests" in the balance sheet and "Minority interests" in the 
income statement, as there is no direct representation of minority interests. 
Additionally, all other consolidation adjustments, including gains and losses 
within the group, are eliminated proportionately. 
In the case of elimination of receivables and payables between consolidated 
subsidiaries with different methods of consolidation, it is necessary, for the 
purposes of proportionate consolidation, the reclassification of the portion of the 
credit or debit  due to/from third parties. 
The equity method, however, has completely different effects on the financial 
statements of the venturer. This method of consolidation is explained in IAS 28. 
According to the equity method, participation in a JCEs is initially recognized at 
cost and, subsequently, the carrying amount is increased or decreased to reflect the 
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share of the associate's profits or losses of the investee, after the date of 
acquisition.  
The application of this method is characterized by the systematic review of the 
value of the investment following on the performance of the subsidiary" (Agliata et 
al., 2013). 
With the application of IAS 31, we have moved from the obligation of using the 
proportionate consolidation (Legislative Decree no. 127/1991) to the choice of the 
equity method or the proportionate method. 
In recent years, however, the debate on appropriate accounting methods provided 
by the IAS and the convergence process versus US accounting standards, namely 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), issued by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB ) has increased. Following on this debate the 
IASB has assumed, then, a new decision, with significant repercussions on JCEs. 
 
Versus the US GAAP  
 
With the aim to achieve the compatibility between IAS and US GAAP, the IASB 
and the US FASB concluded, in May 2011, the project for the issue of three new 
standards, concerned the financial and disclosure requirements for investments in 
subsidiaries, joint ventures agreements, in associates and non-consolidated 
companies. The start date of the preparation of financial statements, according to 
these principles, would be January 1, 2014. 
The new standards are designed to provide better financial information to a wider 
range of stakeholders. In fact, the better is the quality of information provided by 
financial statements, better will be the decisions of stakeholders, with lower 
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information asymmetries. 
In this regard, the accounting treatment for  JCEs has been object of fervent 
debate. The revision of IAS 31 has led to the issue of IFRS 11, as a result of 
convergence process between US GAAP and IAS, to provide a better and more 
transparent financial information. 
The IFRS  11 address two aspects of IAS 31: first, that the structure of the 
arrangement is the only determinant of the accounting and, second, that an entity 
cannot chose the proportionate accounting treatment for interests in JCEs. This 
IFRS shall be applied by all entities that that have an interest in arrangements that 
are controlled jointly (ie joint arrangements) and defines a joint arrangements as 
an arrangements which two or more parties have a joint controls. 
With the terms  joint arrangement the standards intends either a joint operation or 
a JCEs, the main features is the joint control,  defined as “the contractually agreed 
sharing of control of an arrangement, which exists only when decisions about the 
relevant activities require the unanimous consent of the parties sharing 
control”(IFRS, a:7). 
The classification of a joint arrangement as a joint operation or a JCEs depends 
upon the rights and obligations of the parties to the arrangement. 
A joint operation is a joint arrangement whereby the parties that have joint control 
of the arrangement have rights to the assets, and obligations for the liabilities, 
relating to the arrangement. Those parties are called joint operators.   
A JCEs is a joint arrangement whereby the parties that have joint control of the 
arrangement have rights to the net assets of the arrangement. The accounting is 
different if we consider the joint operation or a JCEs.  
In particular for the joint operation the “operator” shall recognizes in relation to its 
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interest in a joint operation: 
 its assets, including its share of any assets held jointly; 
 its liabilities, including its share of any liabilities incurred jointly; 
 its revenue from the sale of its share of the output arising from the joint 
operation; 
 its share of the revenue from the sale of the output by the joint operation; 
 its expenses, including its share of any expenses incurred jointly. 
For the JCEs, the venturer shall recognizes its interest in a JCEs as an investment 
and shall account for that investment using the Equity method in accordance with 
IAS 28 (Investments in Associates) and JCEs unless the entity is exempted from 
applying the Equity method as specified in that standard. 
Is not easy to distinguish  if there is an interest in a joint operation or in a joint 
venture, but the IFRS guidance will assist entities to assess their rights and 
obligations by setting out those indicators that an entity should consider: the 
structure and legal form of the arrangement, the terms agreed by the parties in the 
contractual arrangement and, when relevant, other facts and circumstances. 
The main difference between IAS 31 and IFRS 11 are in the accounting 
requirements, in the IAS 31, were driven only by whether the arrangements were 
structured through an entity. For example, ‘jointly controlled operations’ and 
‘jointly controlled assets’ were arrangements in IAS 31 that did not require the 
existence of an entity. Firms were simply required to recognize assets, liabilities, 
revenues and expenses arising from the arrangements. However, when the same 
arrangements were structured through an entity, IAS 31 classified them as ‘jointly 
controlled entities’ and offered venturer an accounting choice between Equity 
method and Proportionate consolidation. Under the new requirement the 
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accounting for joint arrangements will be driven by a principle, namely that parties 
should recognize their rights and obligations arising from the arrangements. The 
parties’ rights and obligations will result in either the recognition of assets and 
liabilities and corresponding revenues and expenses or in the recognition of an 
investment. IFRS 11 provides application guidance to assist entities in determining 
precisely whether they have rights to assets and obligations for liabilities (in which 
case, the parties have an interest in a joint operation) or whether they have rights 
to the net (in which case, the parties have an interest in a JCEs). An entity will be 
required to apply judgement when assessing its rights and obligations arising from 
the arrangements, because this will determine the classification of the 
arrangements. 
Concerning the exclusive application of the Equity method required by the new 
standards  is important to underline that the IAS 31 did not suggested the use of 
the Equity method, since it does not reflected the substance and reality of an 
entity’s interest in a joint controlled entities. The IASB’ change of course is 
associate with the meaning of “economic substance” of the arrangement. It is 
defined by the rights and obligations assumed by the parties when carrying out the 
activities of the arrangement. As a result, the accounting for joint arrangements 
should faithfully reflect the rights and obligations that the parties have in respect 
of the assets and liabilities relating to the arrangement. This is the key of the 
principle. 
In that respect, the IASB observes that many respondents relate economic 
substance to situations where the activities undertaken through joint 
arrangements are closely related to the activities undertaken by the parties on their 
own, or to situations where the parties are closely involved in the operations of the 
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arrangements. For these respondents, the method that better reflects this 
proximity between the entity’s own activities or close involvement and the 
activities carried out through joint arrangements is Proportionate consolidation. 
The IASB thinks that this interpretation of “economic substance” is unsatisfactory 
because in some instances the activities carried out by the parties to joint 
arrangements can be operationally very similar, but the contractual terms agreed 
by the parties to these joint arrangements can confer on the parties very different 
rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities relating to such activities. As a 
result the IASB believes that, by requiring an entity to recognizes its rights and 
obligations arising from its joint arrangements, the core principle of IFRS 11 more 
faithfully represents the economic substance of those arrangements. 
arrangements, the core principle of IFRS 11 more faithfully represents the 
economic substance of those arrangements (IFRS 11, Joint arrangement ). 
 
6. The main studies on JCEs and accounting choices 
 
One of the most important contribution in the accounting literature concerning  
the accounting choices is provided by Fields et al. (2001).  
The paper makes a research review from 1990 to 2001 examining the determinants 
and consequences of accounting choice addresses the fundamental question of 
whether accounting matters. 
The authors structured the analysis considering three different market 
imperfections that affect the management choice: 
1) Agency costs: related to the contractual issue, manager compensation and 
debt covenants. In this perspective the accounting choice is determined to 
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influence firms’s contractual arrangements, including executive 
compensation agreements and debt covenants. It possible that ex-post the 
choice may be made increase compensation or avoid the covenant violation. 
The objective could include: contractual motivation, internal agency 
conflict- executive compensation, managerial opportunism, external agency 
conflict- bond covenants,  
2) Asymmetries: In this case the accounting choice has as objective modify the 
asset price. The objective could include: asset  pricing motivation, disclosure 
policies, earnings managements, market efficiency. 
3) Externalities: affecting non contracting parties (third party contractual) the 
accounting choice attempts to modify the decision of third parties. The 
objective could include: taxes, regulation. 
To analyze the role of accounting, they provide a definition of accounting choice: 
“An accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to influence 
(either in form or substance) the output of the accounting system in a particular 
way, including not only financial statements published in accordance with GAAP, 
but also tax returns and regulatory filings” 
This definition is broad enough to include the choice of Equity vs. Proportionate 
for the consolidation of interest in JCEs ,  choice affecting the level of disclosure, 
the value relevance and  the consolidated financial statement ratio.  
The main studies on the accounting treatment for JCEs are divided into two broad 
categories:  Effects and Determinant of the use of Equity or Proportionate. 
A brief review of the most important paper concerning the effects and the 
determinants of using Equity or Proportionate is conducted. 
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Effects 
 
The papers on the effects of accounting treatments for JCEs, concern the value 
relevance to alternative reporting method. Since the Equity or Proportionate do 
not affect venturer’s net income and shareholder Equity, but have a relevant 
impact on the main key performance indicators and on the disclosure provided, is 
possible to observe the market effects deriving  from alternative reporting.  
In 2003, Kothavala investigates the relative information provides by Equity or 
Proportionate method for the accounting treatment of JCEs, for explaining the 
market risk. The author uses  a Canadian sample of 117, for the period 1995 to 
2000. The research is conducted in the Canadian context since the accounting 
regulation requires the application of the Proportionate consolidation, in contrast  
to the US regulation that requires the only application of the Equity method.   
In particular the research testes the risk relevance captured by the ability of 
financial statement amount to explain variation in the market risk benchmarks.  
As market benchmark proxy is  considered: 
1) the share price volatility, (measured as standard deviation of share price 
calculated over 250 trading days prior fiscal year- end);  
2) the bond rating range. 
The study analyzes the relation of the market risks with the accounting ratios 
under the application of the Equity and under the Proportionate, through a pro-
quota calculation. 
The accounting ratios used are size, debt to Equity, return on assets, variability of 
return on asset, profit margin, revenues volatility. The author considers this ratios, 
since are affected by the method used and are linked to market risk.  
The price based measures reflect a wide spectrum of market participant and 
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financial user. The bond rating measures reflect a small group of users that used a 
specialized information and attest to the credit- worthiness of firms and the 
probability of firms defaulting on its principal payment.  
The assumption of the author is that the bond raters consider JCEs liabilities along 
with investor liabilities (Bailey 2003) hence if the market participants and the 
bond raters consider the liabilities of JCEs like investor liabilities the 
Proportionate accounting ratios will reflect the price volatility, because include 
more participant, and the Equity method will reflect the bond rating, because the 
raters have other specific information and for them is not important the 
Proportionate. 
He considers the following assumptions on the accounting ratios:  
1) the larger firms have less risks than smaller firms ; 
2) leverage is a good predictor of financial failure and bond ratings; 
3) return on asset is a proxy of asset risks; 
4)  there is an association between earnings volatility and systematic risks; 
5) profit margin is a good predictor of bond rating, low profit margin increases 
firm risk; 
6) revenues volatility is a measure of asset risk. 
The results show that the Proportionate has higher risk relevance than Equity to 
explain the price volatility, but the Equity has higher risk relevance than 
Proportionate to explain the bond rating, it depend on the type of user that are 
interesting to the balance sheet.  
Graham et al., in 2003, analyze the information provides by the Equity and the 
Proportionate consolidation for the accounting of JCEs in predicting accounting 
return on common shareholders equity. They use a sample of Canadian firms 
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reporting JCEs under Proportionate consolidation. The sample is composed by 78 
companies for the period 1995-2001. Also in this case a pro- forma simulation of 
Equity method is conducted. 
The main assumption in the study is that the ROCSE (the rate of return on 
common shareholders’ equity) under the Equity method is the same that under the 
Proportionate method, but the authors examine the predictive ability of the 
component of ROCSE under the alternative methods. 
The ROCSE components are: leverage, total asset turnover, profit margin.  
They apply four different regressions model to consider separately: 
 the effect of each financial statements measures under the Equity and under 
the Proportionate on ROCSE; 
 the effect combined of all financial statements measures on ROCSE. 
The results revel that the Proportionate consolidation better predicts the future 
return on common shareholder’s Equity. 
Stoltzfus  and  Epps (2005) conduct an analysis on bond risk premiums, to 
determine if creditors of companies with investments in JCEs reflect “legal” or 
“implicit” measures of the debts of JCEs.  
In particular the “legal” prospective considers the loss from an investment in a 
JCEs limited to the investment, the “implicit” prospective considers 
interdependent the activities of the JCEs and venturer. The legal view reflects  the 
Equity as accounting method, and implicit the Proportionate. 
The aim of the study is analyzes if the bond risk premiums are more highly 
associated with accounting number of Equity method than Proportionate, it clearly 
depends on how the creditors view the debts. 
This study compares the accounting information generated using Equity method 
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and  using Proportionate with a US sample for the period 1996 to 1999. 
Bond risk premiums are defined as the difference between the yield on a risky 
security (corporate bond) and the yield on a risk-free. The independent variables 
are the return on asset, debt to market, interest coverage, ratio, variance of net 
income. 
The hypothesis carried is the following: if creditors view la JCEs using the legal 
interpretation, bond risks measures should ignore the off balance sheet JCEs debts 
(that not involved directly the investor) because the company’s loss is limited to 
the original investments, on the other hand if is used the implicit bond risks 
measures adjust for the off balance sheet debts. In the implicit perspective the risk 
premium model improves with the use of Proportionate consolidation.  
In addition considering that the creditors of a companies with investments in JCEs 
guarantee the debt of JCEs, should assess a greater risk of default due to the 
presence of guarantee, for this reason the sample is split in two: with guarantee 
and without guarantee liabilities, to understand if there is an influence on the 
power of bond risk model. In this second case the risk premium model improves 
with the use of Proportionate consolidation when limiting the sample to companies 
that guarantee the debt. 
The results show that there is no improvement in the association between bond 
premium and accounting information due to the converting from Equity to 
Proportionate. On average, creditors do not get better information with accounting 
data based on Proportionate consolidation. The result change when consider the 
guarantee of the JCEs debts, there is a stronger association to risk premium when 
is used the Proportionate consolidation.  
Bauman (2007) tests if the financial statement measures under the Proportionate 
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consolidation  for the accounting of JCEs are more relevant for the bond rating 
than financial statement measures under the Equity consolidation. The researcher 
uses a sample of manufacturing companies under US GAAP. The principle  
prescribes the only application of the Equity method in opposition to the Canadian 
sample where is prescribed only the Proportionate consolidation. 
The study makes a reviewing to the Kothavala (2003) analysis, and provides 
additional evidence regarding this topic, since the results are completely in 
contrast with the previous study: the Proportionate consolidation is more relevant 
for explaining bond ratings. In addition the analysis is conducted considering the 
guarantee of the JCEs debt, in particular according to Stoltzfus and Epps (2005) 
the research questioning how different may be the result if the firms guarantee the 
debt of JCEs. 
In the first step the author employed the same model applied by Kothavala, with 
the same variables. Also in this study a simulation of pro forma consolidation of 
Proportionate method is done, considering that the companies have to use only the 
Equity.  
In the second step the author modifies the Kothaval’s model. In particular replaces 
the market value of Equity for the book value of Equity, for the revenue volatility 
and replaces book value of Equity in the leverage term.  
In the third step the author includes the guarantee of investee obligation made by 
investors. The sample is composed by 39 firms and 173 observation for the period 
1999-2001. The results indicate that the Proportionate consolidation provides 
greater relevance for explaining bond rating. The differences in the results could be 
traced back to the sample used, that in this analysis is more homogeneous, because 
considers only manufacturing firms. In addition  in opposition to Stoltzfus and 
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Epps analysis this result are not affects by the guarantee on debt. 
 
Determinants 
 
The studies on the determinants of the management’ accounting choice for the 
consolidation of interest in JCEs using Equity or Proportionate are really few, and 
consider which could be the appropriate reporting method. The lack of evidence on 
this topic in the accounting literature, especially in Italy, make the present study 
appeling. 
The following the main contributions. 
Reklau, (1977)  investigates if the accounting method for the consolidation of 
interests in JCEs is appropriate in the American context where is required the 
application of  the Equity method for the JCEs when the investor  is able to 
exercise significant influence over the entity. The variables analyzed are: 
 the form of organization: is important to distinguish between corporate or 
no- corporate form, in the first case the investor is limited liability with 
respect to the JCEs ‘s obligations, a creditor’s recourse for a JCEs liabilities 
is limited to the asset of JCEs. The author argues that limited liabilities may 
be related only to the current liabilities (trade payables or accrued expense) 
because many institutional lenders would require that least one of the 
investor guarantee directly or not all or a substantial portion of the 
institutional loans of JCEs. In this case the author considers better the 
Proportionate consolidation; 
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 The nature of JCEs: some arrangements are essentially financial 
agreements, and the investor have a passive rule.  In this case for the author 
is  more appropriate the Equity method; 
 The JCEs liabilities: the liabilities of a corporate JCEs are not directly 
enforceable against its owners from the creditors; but the guarantee of all 
JCEs loans by at least one of co-venturers is often required by the lenders 
because is the sole basis of a JCEs’ ability to borrow. There are many 
indirect guarantees (coverage of debt service, working capital maintenance 
agreements, price supports agreements). In other case, many corporation 
prefer to guarantee the JCEs debt in order to protect their business 
reputation, so in many case, we have the same risk or rewards of a non-
corporate forms.  The Proportionate is considered more appropriate. 
 The financial condition of co-venturers: is an important issue to evaluate 
the risks associated with investments in JCEs, in the case of a non- 
corporate JCEs but also for a corporate JCEs when are guarantee the debt of 
JCEs if one of the co-venturers is in a weak financial condition, it involved 
the other co-venturers and the substance of a JCEs. In this case the author 
finds the Proportionate consolidation  more appropriate. 
In summary the researcher concludes that the Equity method is not appropriate 
and not usefulness to reflect the information about the JCEs.  
Lourenço and Curto 2010 provide the first contribute on the determinants of 
accounting choice for the consolidation of interest in JCEs. 
The paper investigates if the type of JCEs influences the management’s choice to 
consolidated with Equity or Proportionate method. 
The analysis is conducted in the UK contexts, where starting from 2005, all firms 
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had to changes their reporting method from gross Equity (under UK GAAP) 
method to Equity or Proportionate method (under IAS 31). The authors 
hypothesize that the company are more incentive to choose Proportionate 
consolidation if have the majority of JCEs “Link” instead of “Scale”. In addition the 
authors assume that the debt covenant and monitoring costs have an impact on the 
choice between alternative reporting methods. 
The authors classify the JCEs in two different categories in accordance with 
Hennart (1998): scale and link. 
Under Hennart definition scale JCEs are create when the venturers belong to the 
same industry and they enter in a contiguous stage of production or distribution or 
a new market together (Homogeneous cooperation). This type of JCEs arises when 
venturers seek to internalize a failing market. In this case, the venturers create the 
JCEs instead to buying some component from an independent party (Third party). 
Is a simply way to avoiding the failing transaction costs, they are not directly 
involved in the agreements they do not bring their specifically skills. The JCEs are 
closely to a subsidiary. The authors view the Equity method more appropriate. 
Link JCEs are create when the venturers come from different business and intend 
to entry in a new business together and each contributes in a different way to 
develop the new business, they bring their specifically skills, and have a significant 
involvement in a day by day management of the business activities. In this case is 
not present a third party. The JCEs are closely to joint controlled assets or 
operation (JCAOs) (because is like a control over the venturer’s share of the JCEs’s 
assets and liabilities ). In this case, they suppose Proportionate method more 
appropriate. 
To developed their hypothesis the authors consider, first of all, that the UK firms 
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prefer to change to Proportionate consolidation when this method better reflect 
the economic reality of JCEs. The research is conducted using a sample of 159 
companies. The dependent variable is the reporting method used following the 
adoption of IAS 31,  The independent variable are: 
1) the type of JCEs, link or scale; 
2) leverage position (as debt covenant proxy) 
3) return on asset position  
4) assets position; 
5) return on asset versus cost of debt (as debt covenant proxy); 
6) importance of change (as monitoring costs proxy), 
7) guarantee.  
Also in the study a pro forma Proportionate consolidation amount are computed. 
The results reveal that link venturers are more likely to apply Proportionate, unless 
when their leverage is lower than but approximate to the industry median; their 
return on asset is lower than the cost of debt; the change have a significant impact 
on venturer’s total assets or liabilities. 
Curto and Fernandes (2011)  investigates if the market considers the assets and the 
liabilities of the JCEs as assets and liabilities of venturer. 
The topic is very relevant, and intends to provide an answer about the appropriate 
accounting consolidation. 
The researchers examine how the JCEs liabilities are usefulness to explaining stock 
price over traditional summary measures, such as book value and earnings (in 
terms of share price); in particular the authors analyze the value relevance of JCEs’ 
assets and liabilities compared to those of the venturer, and the incremental 
information content in the Proportionate consolidation financial statement 
Chapter 1.Theoretical aspects of JCEs 
40 
 
amounts as compared to the Equity method amounts in explaining future return 
on Equity,  from capital market perspective. 
The sample is composed by 147 French firm- years for the period  2005- 2008. The 
French companies before IAS 31 applied only the Proportionate method and still 
applying this method according to IAS 31, so the authors consider only the 
companies that applied the Proportionate consolidation because the analysis 
resulting not affected by few case of Equity consolidation. The model used is the 
accounting based valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995). 
The dependent variable is the share price;  independent variables are total asset 
and total liabilities computed by Proportionate consolidation and net income. 
After they consider other independents variable in order to assess how the market 
views the venturer’s share of JCEs assets and liabilities, (total assets and liabilities 
excluding  the venturer’s share of JCEs assets and liabilities)  
The results reveal that the sector has an important impact, in particular in the 
industrial sector there is a higher correlation between the assets and the liabilities 
of the JCEs with assets and liabilities of venturer. The results suggest that the 
investors view the assets and liabilities of the JCEs similarly to the assets and 
liabilities of the venturer.  
Moreover the results suggest that the investor knows the involvement of the 
venturers in the JCEs activities, and interprets the JCEs’ assets and liabilities as if 
they belong to the venturers. 
In conclusion the paper doesn’t support the IASB decision to eliminate the 
Proportionate; 
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7.Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we analyzed the legislative steps that have characterized the 
accounting treatment for JCE in time. 
The choice of the Equity method allowed by IAS 31, became with IFRS 11 the only 
options. 
The theoretical debate on the appropriate accounting method is not completed, 
especially after the mandatory introduction of IFRS 11.  The lack of an academic 
consensus does not provide a convincing evidence on the superiority of one 
method over another. 
The alternatives reporting methods have had a different diffusion, due to specific 
country regulation and considering the accounting method preferred in the 
practice in each countries (for example the Equity method is preferred in the 
Anglo-Saxon context while the Proportionate is more used in the other European 
countries).  
The transition to Equity method has produces a considerable impact on the 
consolidated financial statement under the Proportionate. 
The present Thesis, focus on the determinants underlying the manager’s 
accounting choice for the consolidation of interests in JCEs when the multiple 
accounting choice was allowed in accordance to IAS 31. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Joint Controlled Entities: comparability in a multiple 
accounting choices. 
Evidences from Italian setting 
 
 
 
1.Introduction  
 
The objective of this research is to observe the accounting convergence for the 
reporting of interests in JCEs using the Equity method or the Proportionate 
consolidation and to explore the determinants that could affect the management’s 
accounting choice. 
The study has its roots in a previous research on the consolidation of investments in 
subsidiaries, associates, JCEs and other Equity interests in Italy and Spain 
(Catuogno &  Allini, 2011). This study reveals a decrease in the level of 
comparability among Italian and Spanish financial statements when the single 
financial accounting principles provide multiple evaluation options.  
In particular, for the consolidation of the interests in JCEs the alternative between 
the Equity method and the Proportionate undermines the convergence of the 
accounting practices.  
Consistently with what we claimed, on May 2011 the IASB issued IFRS 11, Joint 
Arrangements, with the main purpose to increase comparability within IFRS by 
removing the choice for JCEs to use Proportionate consolidation. Instead, JCEs 
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that meet the definition of a JCEs must be accounted for using the Equity method. 
This also converges with US GAAP, which generally requires the Equity method for 
JCEs . 
Starting from this findings, we intend to develop our research by focusing on the 
interest in JCEs held by Italian listed groups, analyzing consolidated financial 
statements date for the period which goes from 31/12/2006 to 31/12/2010. We 
focus on JCEs, since there was little literature on this topic and Standards Setters 
recently focus on identifying the appropriate accounting method (Soonawalla, 
2006). 
Even though both method do not affect venturer’s net income and shareholder 
Equity, they have a relevant impact on the main key performance indicators, 
(Return on assets, Leverage, and Profit Margin), (Graham et al, 2003;  Bauman, 
2007). In particular total assets and total liabilities are lower under the Equity 
method and the magnitude of the debt of JCEs is hidden, this produces higher 
profitability in terms of Profit Margin. 
Hence after measuring convergence, the research intends to observe if the market is 
indirectly affects by the lack of accounting convergence practice and rewards firms 
applying Equity method with better key performance indicators. The market could 
explains the discretionary behavior of the manager for the accounting treatment of 
JCEs. 
Vice versa our research question is addressed on the existence of others latent 
variables that undermine the comparability.  
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To measure the convergence for the consolidation of the interests in JCEs we use 
the van der Tas Herfindahl H index, since it is particularly suitable for the 
measurement of the comparability within one Country (van der Tas, 1988). 
Subsequently we observe the Price Earning distribution - as a measure of firm’s 
investors reputation - associated with the application of each accounting method 
required by IAS 31 (Darryl et al.,1987). 
Finally we adopt an exploratory research design, the  Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), (Ghauri et al., 1995) based on two parameters, Price/Earnings (as a measure 
of firm’s investors reputation) (Little, 1999) and  method of consolidation for JCEs 
(Equity or Proportionate) with the aim to  investigate the existence of latent variables 
that could explain the accounting choices for the consolidation of JCEs. 
Using a sample of 215 Italian groups, first findings show that the market does not 
influence the managers’ choice since does not reward firms adopting the Equity 
method in the consolidation of their interests in JCEs, which present, as a result, 
better key performance indicators. Our findings suggest that the firm’s 
creditworthiness, as measured by the firm’s rating could represents one of possible 
latent variable. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents summary of the accounting 
for JCEs, section 3 the accounting convergence, section 4 describes the accounting 
debate on JCEs, section 5 the assumptions and the methodology, section 6 
describes sample and data collection, section 7 shows results and section 8 
concludes.  
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2. The accounting for JCEs  
 
The consolidation of interests in JCEs raises a relevant problem of harmonization 
and comparability, with both conceptual and operational implications. 
Since Italian regulation does not provide a specific definition of JCEs, neither 
specifically addresses the different types of agreement which characterize the JCEs, 
we consider the International regulation as a benchmark also for the national 
perspective in the accounting for the interests in JCEs.  
Starting form 2005, with the mandatory introduction of the IAS/IFRS, all the 
companies adopting such principles have been applying IAS 31 for the accounting 
of interests in JCEs.  
IAS 31 classifies joint arrangements into three broad categories: jointly controlled 
operations (JCOs), jointly controlled assets (JCAs) and jointly controlled entities 
(JCEs), prescribing different accounting method for each type of JCEs. 
According to IAS 31, it is possible to identify a JCOs (par. 13) “when the operation 
of some JCEs involves the use of the assets and other resources of the venturers 
rather than the establishment of a corporation, partnership or other entity, or a 
financial structure that is separate from the venturers themselves”; JCAs (par. 18) 
“when the operation of some JCEs involves the joint control, and often the joint 
ownership, by the venturers of one or more assets contributed to, or acquired for 
the purpose of, the JCEs and dedicated to the purposes of the JCEs” and finally a 
JCEs (par. 24) “when the JCEs involve the establishment of a corporation, 
partnership or other entity in which each venturer has an interest”.  
Regarding the accounting for the interests in JCEs, the International Standards 
allows the recognition of investments held in JCEs, in the venturer financial 
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statement, through one of the two methods between the Equity method or the 
Proportionate consolidation. 
On the other hand, the Italian regulation (Legislative Decree n. 127/1991 art. 33) 
establish the application of the Equity method if the company decides not to 
consolidate the JCEs, and the Proportionate method for the consolidation of JCEs. 
The impact on venturer financial statement will be different according to the 
accounting method chosen. In particular, under the Proportionate method a 
venturer’s share of each of the assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses of a JCEs is 
combined line by line with similar items in the venturer’s financial statements or 
reported as separate line items in the venturer’s financial statements. Otherwise, 
under the Equity method an interest in a JCEs is initially recorded at cost and 
thereafter adjusted for the post-acquisition change in the venturer’s share of net 
assets of the JCEs. 
Since that, the Board considers the multiple evaluation options allowed by IAS 31 as 
an impediment to high quality reporting of joint arrangements and in order to 
reduce differences between IFRS and US GAAP, it was necessary a project to 
replace IAS 31, with the aims to provide more transparent and relevant financial 
information for the investors and creditors. 
As a result, the IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements was published in 2011 by the IASB as 
part of its new suite of consolidation and related standards, also replacing existing 
requirements for subsidiaries. 
The standard is applied starting from 2014.  
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The remainder of  IAS 31 JCEs, now called JCEs, does not allow the free choose 
between the Equity method or Proportionate consolidation, all entities must now 
always use the Equity method.  
In the Basis for Conclusions of IFRS 11 the main argument supporting the 
elimination of Proportionate method refers to the principles-based approach, to a 
better convergence with US GAAP and to a better verifiability, comparability and 
understandability of the financial statement.  
 
3. The accounting convergence 
 
The consolidation of interests in JCEs raises a relevant problem of harmonization 
and convergence, with both conceptual and operational implications. With the 
mandatory introduction of the International Accounting Standards/International 
Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IAS/IFRS), a fundamental step has been 
taken towards convergence among countries with different accounting traditions in 
the preparation of consolidated financial statements.  
In the accounting literature, the harmonization has been researched in terms of the 
standards that have been adopted, or in terms of the accounting behaviors (Tay & 
Parker, 1990; D’Arcy, 2001; Ding et al., 2007; Jaafar & Mc Leay, 2007). In the first 
case, we deal with a process which leads to the harmonization of the accounting 
standards. This interpretation has been called de jure harmonization (van der Tas, 
1998). In the second case, instead, the harmonization of accounting choices does 
not depend on the existence of a same set of accounting principles. The de jure 
harmonization is usually expected to lead to the de facto harmonization, however 
this is not always true. Scholars revealed the existence of factors, other than 
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regulations, that affect the accounting practices (Alexander & Nobes, 1997; Cairns, 
2011; Nobes, 2011). As a matter of fact, the de jure harmonization can be 
accompanied by disharmony in the accounting practices when specific accounting 
standards allow multiple accounting evaluation choices. On the other side, the de 
facto harmonization can exist without determining an increase in the level of de 
jure harmonization. This phenomenon is known as “spontaneous harmonization” 
(Canibano & Mora, 2000: 4). Moreover the degree of harmonization can be 
acknowledged through the divergence among practices in various countries, but 
also by investigating the behavior in the same geographical context. 
Previous studies confirmed the existence of factors, other than regulations, that 
can affect both the accounting practices and the value relevance of the accounting 
information (Alexander & Nobes, 2007; Nobes et al., 2008; Cairns et al., 2011).  
The existing literature investigated accounting harmonization (rectius accounting 
comparability) by assuming different perspectives. Raham et al. (2002) classified this 
contributes in six main categories.  
The first group examines accounting practices and regulations as well as the 
environmental factors that influence them in different countries (Nobes, 2006; 
Radebaugh & Gray, 1993).  
The second group focuses mainly on different aspects of regulation (Adhikari & 
Tondkar, 1992).  
The third group analyses accounting practice harmony at a point in time and 
accounting practice harmonization, through measurement of movements in harmony 
over a period of time ( Nair & Frank, 1981; Evans & Taylor, 1982).  
The fourth group examines the relation between accounting practice harmonization 
and key financial ratios (Weetman & Gray, 1990; Hellman, 1993). 
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The fifth group considers the concerns about accounting practice harmony 
measurement techniques raised in the literature and tried to improve the 
methodology in that respect (Tay & Parker, 1992; van der Tas, 1992).  
Finally, the last group analyzes the association of practice harmonization and 
market reaction.  
In particular, some papers captured share prices as market reaction (Alford et al., 
1993; Amir et al., 1993; Barth & Clinch, 1996; Harris et al., 1994), while Ball et. al 
(2000) observed the market relevance of accounting earnings in common-law and 
code-law countries and found different institutional factors that can influence the 
value relevance of earnings in the two types of countries. The research introduced 
a means of testing the influence of environmental variables on at least one 
outcome of accounting, market reactions to accounting information.  
Our paper fills in this last group of studies. We intend to contribute to this debate 
by analysing the relation between accounting comparability and market reaction to 
the differing accounting choices related to interests in JCEs. 
 
4. The accounting debate on the Joint Controlled Entities 
treatment 
 
Empirical findings confirm and reveal that when the International Accounting 
Standards offers multiple options for the valuation of the same items decrease the 
convergence among financial statements (Mechelli, 2009; Morais &  Curto, 2009). 
This is also the case for the consolidation of interests in JCEs as IAS 31 provided 
two accounting treatments, the Proportionate consolidation and the Equity 
method. Thus, the recent issue of IFRS 11 eliminates the problem of this multiple 
option, confirming only the Equity method to account for JCEs.  
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However literature does not provide convincing evidence on the superiority of one 
method over another.  
The first contributes supporting the Equity method focuses on the lack of a 
theoretical basis for recording the Proportionate share of JCEs accounts because 
resources subject to joint control do not fit with the traditional definitions of assets 
and liabilities. In a past study, Milburn and Chant (Milburn & Chant, 1999) 
conclude that the Equity method is the more appropriate, primarily because jointly 
controlled assets and liabilities do not comply with the control criterion required 
for full consolidation with the venturer. It complies with a so called legal model 
(Stoltzfus & Epps, 2005). Supporters of the Equity method also point out that if 
the venturer does not guarantee the liabilities of the JCEs and does not otherwise 
have an obligation for them, the debt should not be recognized in the venturer’s 
financial statement (Milburn & Chant, 1999). As the venturer is not ultimately 
responsible for debts, the venturer should not disclose the debt, as if it was their 
obligation. 
Moreover, proponents of the Equity method argue also that Proportionate 
consolidation determines financial statements that might be not easy to analyze and 
interpret for a potential investor and comparability would be affected. Bierman 
(1992) noticed that the primary disadvantage of Proportionate method is that 
accounting complexities are introduced compared to just showing an investment in 
common stock.  
On the other hand, the primary arguments for Proportionate consolidation reflect 
the assumption that it provides more useful information compared to the Equity 
method’s single line presentation. It complies with a so called implicit model. In 
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this direction, Graham et al. (2003) compare the two methods revealing that 
Proportionate consolidated financial statements are more useful in predicting 
future returns on shareholders’ Equity than the Equity method. He found a 
stronger relation between current and prior-year components of return on Equity 
and current year stock returns as well a stronger relation between return on 
common shareholders’ Equity and prior-year disaggregated components (profit 
margin, asset turnover, and the leverage ratio). An empirical investigation in the 
Australian real estate industry sector suggests that, in practice, venturers chose the 
Proportionate method when the JCEs debt was recourse and the Equity method 
when the JCEs debt was non-recourse (Whittred &  Zimmer,1994).  
Then, among studies on accounting for JCEs, there are few contributes exploring 
the relation between the adopted method and the market reaction. In particular, 
prior research documents an association between JCEs investments and share 
prices  (Park & Kim, 1997), without monitoring whether JCEs accounting amounts 
are associated with share prices. Maines et al. (2000) investigated whether analysts 
give different Equity values depending on whether a firm adopts the Equity or 
Proportionate method to account for JCEs interests. They find that analysts with 
low familiarity in JCEs accounting rules assigned higher Equity values to firms with 
Equity method financial statements than to firms with Proportionate consolidated 
financial statements. Their study supported the idea that aggregating JCEs 
accounting amounts leads to loss of value relevant information. Kothavala (2003) 
tests the risk relevance of JCEs accounting amounts and ratios for a sample of 
Canadian firms and finds that disaggregated information on JCEs accounting 
amounts helps explain variation in market risk. Other scholars (Lim et al, 2003) 
highlight that the Equity method supports relevant information for users. Stoltzfus 
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and Epps (2005) analyze if the bond risk premiums are more highly associated with 
accounting number of Proportionate than Equity method and revel that, on 
average, creditors do not get better information with accounting data based on 
Proportionate consolidation. 
As noticed, literature provides mixed results on the supremacy of one method to 
another for the case of JCEs and it make appealing the study on the appropriate 
accounting method. 
 
5. The assumptions and the methodology 
 
In a previous research on the consolidation of investments in subsidiaries, 
associates, JCEs and other Equity interests in Italy and Spain, we observed a 
decrease in the level of comparability – as measured thought the use of C index – 
among financial statements, when the single financial accounting principles 
provide multiple evaluation options (Catuogno & Allini, 2011). Starting from these 
findings, we intent to provide first evidence on accounting convergence for the 
reporting of interests in JCEs in Italy. 
Our research relies on firms listed in the Italian Stock Exchange. We hand 
collected data from the firms’ website and from the Mediobanca database. 
The sample selection starts with the universe of Italian listed firms. We exclude 
financial service firms for their different accounting regulation, then we selected 
only those firms that report interests in JCEs in their financial statement for fiscal 
year-ends ranging from 2006, to 2010. Further, we exclude non-operating 
companies as they were not representative, companies resulting from 
extraordinary transactions, such as mergers or acquisitions, companies with 
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consolidated financial statements not available or not legible, in order to keep the 
sample homogeneous.  
The Table 1 shows the sample distribution of venturers by fiscal years. The final 
sample consists of 215 firms year observations. 
 
Table 1  
Full sample composition 
 
Firms Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year2009  Year 2010 
Total listed Italian firms 290 307 300 296 296 
Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate 
(83) (81) (80) (75) (76) 
Industrial firms 207 226 220 221 220 
Firms holding interests in 
JCEs 
55 50 44 51 63 
Firms excluded (9) (4) (3) (9) (23) 
Total sample  46 46 41 42 40 
 
Graham et al. (2001) in a study conducted for the Canadian firms compared 
Proportionate consolidation financial statement ratios to Equity method financial 
statement ratios. They underlines that the Equity method would present an 
investment at its net book value (venturer share of JCEs assets – venturer share of 
JCEs liabilities)  and calculated pro-forma Equity method balance sheets from 
Proportionate consolidation balance sheets by subtracting JCEs liabilities from the 
venturers’ JCEs assets and from the venturers’ total liabilities.  Similarly, the Equity 
method would presents the income from the JCEs at its net value (venturer share of 
JCEs revenues – venturer share of JCEs expenses) on the venturers’ income 
statement. Therefore, they calculate Equity method income statements from 
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Proportionate consolidation income statements by subtracting JCEs expenses from 
the venturers’ JCEs revenues. 
Figure 1 illustrates the conversion procedure for Proportionate consolidation 
balance sheets, Figure 2 illustrates the conversion procedure for Proportionate 
consolidation income statements.  
 
Figure 1.  
Venturer Balance Sheet 
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Figure 2.  
Venturer Income Statement 
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As showed in the figures above, the differences between the Equity consolidation 
and the Proportionate method on the financial statement of the venturer mainly 
refer to the total assets, total liabilities, total revenues and total expenses, and in 
accordance with some scholars (Bauman, 2007) we formulate some starting 
assumptions: 
Assumption 1. The ROA (Return on Assets),  measured by Earnings Before 
Interests Expense on Debt divided by the previous year’s total Assets, (Lourenço & 
Curto, 2010) is higher under the application of the Equity method than under the 
application of the Proportionate consolidation; 
Assumption 2. The Leverage, measured by of Long Terms Financial Liabilities to 
Equity (Astami & Tower, 2006), is lower under the application of the Equity 
method than under the application of the Proportionate consolidation; 
Assumption 3. The Profit Margin, measured by Operating Profit to Operating 
Revenues, (Astami & Tower, 2006),  is higher under the application of the Equity 
method than under the application of the Proportionate consolidation. 
 
H index 
 
Accordingly, first of all, we conduct an empirical investigation to measure the 
convergence for the consolidation of the interests in JCEs, through the use of the 
van der Tas Herfindahl H index. van der Tas introduced the Herfindahl index (H 
index) in 1988 (than adjusted by Hirschman) as a measure of the comparability of 
financial statements (van der Tas, 1988).  
The H index is simply and is particularly indicated for the measure of the 
harmonization within a single Country. It is calculated by weighting the relative 
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frequencies of the alternative opinions against each other, the relative frequency is 
the number of parties choosing a particular method divided by the total number of 
parties. The formula of H Index is: 
𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖2
𝑛
𝑖=1
      
 
where: 
H = Herfindahl index; 
n = the number of alternative accounting methods; 
pi = the relative frequency of accounting method i. 
The H index can varies between 0 – there is no harmony - and 1 – all companies 
use the same accounting method. 
 
Price Earnings and Accounting method 
 
After measuring the accounting convergence, considering  the assumptions above, 
the research intends to observe if the market is indirectly affects by the lack of 
accounting convergence practice and rewards firms applying Equity method with 
better key performance indicators. In particular we explore the distribution of the 
Italian selected groups, from 2006 to 2010, based on two parameters: 
1) Price /Earnings, as a measure for firm’s investors reputation; 
2) Method of consolidation for JCE’s. 
The Price Earnings ratio has long been used as an analyst’s tool to assess earnings 
growth potential and investment risks by considering mainly the investor 
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perspective (Beaver & Morse, 1978; Zarowin, 1999). Literature reveals that a 
positive P/E ratio is a proxy of the good firm reputation  (Little, 1999). Moreover, 
scholars posit that P/E ratio are useful in selecting over and under-valued 
companies (Basu, 1977).  
Since stock prices reflect the future expected earnings, companies with potentially 
growth earnings will show higher prices, hence higher P/E.  
Being P/E ratios useful in stock selections, some scholars provide evidence that 
accounting methods are associated with P/E ratios (Darryl et al.,1987).  
For the JCEs, Proportionate consolidation adds significant debt to venturer’s 
balance sheet, and it influence negatively the Earnings per Share ratio and its Share 
Price on the Capital Market. Thus, if accounting methods influence the P/E ratio, 
then P/E ratio should make allowances for differences in accounting and rewards 
(overvalued)  firms with better Key Performance Indicators. We can suppose that 
firms using the Equity method will improve their key performance indicators, hence 
their market reputation is captured by higher P/E ratio.  
We calculate the P/E ratio as a proxy for firm’s investors reputation. The numerator 
of the ratio was defined as the market value of common stock ( market prices times 
number of shares outstanding) as of December 31 and the denominator as reported 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items), (Basu, 1977). 
Several contributions focus on the value intervals that P/E ratio can assume, since 
it depends by many factors. Some scholars consider three intervals of P/E as 
follows, even though the sector can influence P/E levels (Shiller, 2005; I’Ons & 
Ward, 2012):  
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1) P/E ≤ 10 includes the stocks which are undervalued by the market and are less 
expensive; 
2) 15 < P/E ≤ 25 includes the stocks which are expressed at their “fair” value; 
3) P/E  >25 includes the stocks which are overvalued and are more expensive.  
 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
Finally we adopt an exploratory research design, the  Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), (Ghauri et al., 1995) based on two parameters: 
1) Price/Earnings (as a measure of firm’s investors reputation), (Little, 1999); 
2)  Method of consolidation for JCEs (Equity or Proportionate); 
with the aim to  investigate the existence of latent variables that could explain the 
accounting choices for the consolidation of JCEs. 
In particular, we conduct a descriptive statistics analysis, namely the study of 
location, since dispersion and interdependencies among variables assumed in this 
study could be not so easy to interpret when the number of the variables increases. 
Indeed, if we have a data set with n individuals and k variables, such a study need 
the calculation and the interpretation of k averages, k variances and k(k-1)/2 
sample covariance. The principal component analysis (PCA) addresses to  the need 
to represent a k-dimensional phenomenon through a number less than (or equal to) 
k uncorrelated latent variables, obtained by transforming the observed variables 
(Mardia, 1979; Benzecri, 1992; Jobson, 1991). PCA belongs to the family of the set 
of techniques known with the name of factor analysis (Correspondence Analysis, 
Canonical Correlation Analysis, Multiple Correspondence Analysis, and so on). PCA 
Chapter 2. Joint Controlled Entities: comparability in a multiple accounting choices. Evidences from Italian setting 
 
64 
 
is central to the study of multivariate data and largely used in many disciplines 
because it is extremely versatile (Jolliffe, 2002). It is a technique working with a set 
of numerical variables and it consists in the estimation of linear combinations of 
the variables originally observed, with the constraint that they must be uncorrelated 
with each other and have maximum variance. The first principal component (or the 
first factor) is indeed the linear combination of the k starting variables having 
maximum variance, the second principal component is the linear combination of k 
variables with variance immediately below, subject to the constraint of being 
orthogonal to the previous component, and so on. 
More formally, if X is a n×k data matrix, the determination of the first factor 
requires the identification of the k-dimensional vector  u_1 of the coefficients of the 
following linear combination of the k variables: C_1=Xu_1. These variables must be 
at least expressed in terms of deviations from their averages. The total variance of a 
linear transformation of X can be expressed as a function of the covariance matrix 
S:  var (Xu_1) =u_1^' Su_1. 
As the u_1 vector has the constraint to have unit norm, namely it must be that 
u_1^' u_1=1, by applying the Lagrange multipliers formula L=u_1^' Su_1-λ_1 
(u_1^' u_1-1)=max and by setting to zero the derivative respect to u_1 we obtain (S-
λ_1 I)=0.  As λ_1 is the first eigenvalue of the X'X, we have that u_1^' Su_1=u_1^' 
λ_1 u_1=λ_1, namely the first eigenvalue is the variance of the first principal 
component. By continuing with the other factors, we have that C_2=Xu_2,u_2^' 
u_2=1,  u_1^' u_2=0, and so on. Of course one can evaluate as principal 
components as the number k of the variables. There are several ways to choose the 
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“optimal” number of factor to analyze, such as the eigenvalue-one criterion, the scree-
test, criteria based on statistical inference, etc.  
Once the principal components have been defined, it is possible to visualize on a 
plot, named bi-plot, the so called factor loadings (or loadings), which can be 
interpreted as the correlation coefficients between the variables and the factors. 
This visualization technique allows to interpret the latent variables that could affect 
the accounting choices for JCEs, by analyzing these correlations. 
 
6. Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample includes both venturers that reports interests in JCEs by the Equity 
method (98 over 215) and by Proportionate consolidation (117 over 215), as shown 
in the Table 2. 
The number of observations per accounting period is equally distributed across 
Equity and Proportionate method except in 2009 and 2010, where the application 
of Proportionate method prevails (27 over 42 and 24 over 40, respectively). The 
smallest number of observations occurred for the fiscal year 2010. 
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Table 2  
Firms applying Equity versus Proportionate method by Year 
 
 
The Table 3 reveals that companies are mainly concentrated in two sectors, 
Manufacturing (116 over 215) and Trasportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary Service Industry,  respectively (59 over 215), and the rest is spread among the 
other sectors. Moreover the Proportionate method subsample has a higher proportion 
of firms that belongs to Trasportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Service Industry (34 over 59). 
Table 3  
Industry composition  
 
Classification 
Full Sample Equity  Proportionate  
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
01_09 
 
Agriculture,Forestry, 
Fishing 
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
10_14 Mining 5 2% 2 2% 3 3% 
15_17 Construction 19 9% 7 7% 12 10% 
20_39 Manufacturing 116 54% 58 59% 58 50% 
40_49 Trasportation, 59 27% 25 26% 34 29% 
Year 
Full Sample Equity Method Proportionate Method 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
2006 46 21,4 23 23,5 23 19,7 
2007 46 21,4 22 22,4 24 20,5 
2008 41 19,1 22 22,4 19 16,2 
2009 42 19,5 15 15,3 27 23,1 
2010 40 18,6 16 16,3 24 20,5 
Total 215  98  117  
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Communication, 
Electric, Gas, Sanitary 
Service 
50_51 Wholesale Trade 1 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
52_59 Retail Trade 4 2% 1 1% 3 3% 
60_67 
Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate 
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
70_89 Services 11 5% 4 4% 7 6% 
91_99 Public Administration 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 215  98  117  
 
7. Results 
 
Starting from our data collection, we applied the H index to the selected sample. 
By focusing on the accounting convergence, our results indicate that, during the 
observed period, almost 50% of the Italian groups chosen the Equity method, 
despite the IASB recommended the Proportionate consolidation in IAS 31, which 
better reflects the economic substance of the interests inJCEs. Consistent with 
literature (Zeff, 2007)  our findings document that the convergence in Italy still 
remains at a medium level (Table 4).   
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Table 4 
The accounting convergence for JCE over 2006-2010 
 
Year 
Equity Method Proportionate Method TOTAL 
Data Frequency H Data Frequency H  Data Frequency H  
2006  23 0,50 0,25 23 0,50 0,25  46 1 0,500  
2007  22 0,48 0,23 24 0,52 0,27  46 1 0,501  
2008  22 0,54 0,29 19 0,46 0,21  41 1 0,503  
2009  15 0,36 0,16 27 0,64 0,41  42 1 0,541  
2010  16 0,40 0,16 24 0,60 0,36  40 1 0,520  
 
Therefore, in order to explore the distribution of the Price/Earnings ratio related to 
the accounting methods for JCEs chosen by the 215 observed firms, we collected 
data, at the end of each years, from two database, Datastream and Mediobanca.  To 
do this, we adopt an exploratory research design as it provides indications to 
understand the phenomena without explicit expectations or generalization of 
results (Ghauri, 1995; Philips, 1987). More specifically, the P/E ratio is observed in 
association with the two accounting methods for JCEs, the Equity and the 
Proportionate. The results are summarized in Table 5.  
The Table 5, in fact, reveals that even though the convergence for JCEs is not 
achieved, the effects on the P/E ratios are not so different. In fact we can observe 
that the largest part of the companies has an “undervalued” P/E ratio (37% of the 
sample for the Equity, 39% of the sample for the Proportionate), covering the value 
range of 0-10, while no company applying the Equity method presents “a fair” level 
of P/E (15-25). 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Joint Controlled Entities: comparability in a multiple accounting choices. Evidences from Italian setting 
 
69 
 
Table 5 
Firms distribution between P/E ratios and accounting methods for JCEs over 
2006-2010 
 
P/E Range 
 
Equity Method Proportionate Method 
P/E≤0 14% 10% 
0<P/E≤10 37% 39% 
15<P/E≤25 - 0,4% 
P/E>25 - - 
 
Our results indicate that the P/E ratio, as a measure of the firm’s investors 
reputation, is not able to capture the different accounting choices provided by IAS 
31 and their related effects in terms of key performance indicators. 
In fact, the P/E ratio does not seem to reward firms adopting the Equity method in 
the consolidation of their interests in JCEs and that, as a result, present higher 
values of the ROA and the PM, and lower values of Leverage.  
Vice versa a possible explanation for the undervaluation of P/E ratios can be 
related to the financial crises occurred in the last years. 
Finally, in order to conduct the PCA, the k variables include: PM, ROA, LEV (as key 
performance indicators), P/E as a measure of firm’s investors reputation and we 
add Beta as a proxy for firms’ risk (Little et al, 1999) Total Assets, as proxies for 
SIZE and total Revenues (REV) as control variables (Giner & Veron, 2012). 
We chose to perform five PCAs as the data were collected for 5 years on a particular 
type of Italian companies (from 2006 to 2010). In this way, we can explore if and 
how the factors can change over the years.  
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As the configuration of loadings did not changed over the years, we performed the 
analysis also on the entire dataset even if there are several repeated companies in 
the dataset.  
Figure 3 shows the bi-plot containing the factor loadings. First axis represents the 
first principal component, as well as second axis represents the second principal 
component. 
 
Figure 3.  
Principal component analysis (PCA) for JCEs 2006-2010 
 
 
First and second principal components (axis) explain respectively about 35%  and 
28% of the total variance. About the loadings, PM, ROA, PE, REV, LEV and BETA 
are all correlated with the first principal component, with the difference that both  
BETA and LEV have a negative loading with that first component. On the other 
hand, LEV and SIZE characterize the second principal component. 
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Even if PCA is a multivariate technique that works with numerical variables, it is 
also possible to visualize categorical variables as supplemental variables.  
A supplemental variable does not contribute to the construction of the factorial map 
however it is a powerful tool because it shows how the factors explain the categories 
of the supplemental variables into the geometrical space. Hence, we include the 
accounting methods for JCEs (the Equity and the Proportionate one) as 
supplemental variables.  
Figure 3 emphasizes how companies characterized by high values of P/E, PM, ROA 
and REV lean towards the use of Equity method. On the other hand, companies 
with high leverage and BETA tend to use Proportionate consolidation. 
Our findings suggest that the first principal component could be explained in terms 
of the firm’s creditworthiness, namely the firm’s ratings. Whereas the second 
principal component could represents the cost of debt capital. 
If further investigations would confirm the correlation between the accounting 
choices for JCEs and the firm’s creditworthiness, some important concluding 
remarks could be provided to the existing literature debate on the choices of the 
proper accounting method for the consolidation of interest in JCEs. 
 
8. Discussion 
 
Our paper analyzes the accounting convergence in the reporting for interests in 
joint controlled entities (JCEs) using the Equity method or the Proportionate 
consolidation and explores some of the determinants that could explain the 
application of the accounting consolidation method. Evidences provide that the 
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level of convergence is still medium, despite all firms comply with IAS 31. On the 
other hand, the lack of convergence does not affect the value of P/E ratio, since the 
market seems not to reward companies applying the Equity method. 
As far as the principal component analysis is concerned, however, we can draw 
some original conclusions about the explanation of the main latent variables. Our 
findings suggest that the first principal component could be explained in terms of 
the firm’s creditworthiness, as measured by the firm’s rating, whereas the second 
principal component could represent the cost of debt capital 
If the exploratory research design will be confirmed by further statistical 
investigations, it would provide two main implications.  
First of all, consistently with both the characteristics of the Italian financial market 
– which is mainly credit oriented – and with the typical ownership structure – 
which is mostly concentrated or family owned -, we would assert that the market 
reputation, from the investor’s perspective, does not play a relevant role in the 
accounting choices as instead the firm’s creditworthiness does.  
What is more, we could provide an evidence that the accounting choice of the 
Equity method for the consolidation of the JCEs, is supported by the firm’s 
creditworthiness with the final purpose of improving  the firm’s rating. 
Our research presents some limitations. The first limit is linked to the analysis of 
the convergence of financial statement on an item by item base. The extension of 
the test of convergence to other transactions and items would have concurred to 
enhance the actual obtained results. The second limit regards the P/E ratio; other 
performance ratios should be included in order to test if one particular accounting 
method is associated with performance outcomes. Finally, a correlation analysis is 
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required in order to capture and measure factors and variables that could support 
the accounting choices in the consolidation of the JCEs in Italy. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Behind the Equity Method for Interests in Jointly Controlled 
Entities in Italy 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The accounting for JCEs has always been a controversial issue among scholars, 
practitioners and regulators. The relevance and the timeliness of the topic are also 
witnessed by the recent issue of IFRS 11, Joint Arrangements, which removes the 
multiple accounting option. In prescribing merely the Equity method, the IASB aims 
to increase comparability within IFRS and convergence with US GAAP.  
Under the Equity method, JCEs are reported as a single line item investment in the 
statement of financial position and in net income and changes in Equity in the 
statement of comprehensive income. By contrast, under Proportionate consolidation 
the venturer’s Proportionate share of the JCEs’s assets, liabilities, revenues, and 
expenses are added to the venturer’s own items in the consolidated financial 
statements (Adhikari et al., 2014).  
Although both methods do not affect venturer’s net income, retained earnings and 
shareholders equity, they have a relevant impact in terms of components displayed in 
consolidated accounts.  
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The Equity method aggregation leaves out accounting information about the JCEs 
when compared to Proportionate consolidation. Total assets and total liabilities are 
always lower under the Equity method and the magnitude of the debt of the JCEs is 
hidden. Consequently, leverage for venturer – as reflected by liabilities to Equity – 
results in a lower percentage (Astami & Tower, 2006). The same situation occurs in 
the statement of comprehensive income, being revenues and expenses always lower 
under the Equity method. This produces a higher profitability for the venturer, 
measured in terms of profit margin – as reflected by net income to revenues (Davis& 
Largay III, 1999; Kothavala, 2003; Lourenço & Curto, 2010).  
Therefore, the Equity method results in a performance-improving accounting 
technique while the Proportionate consolidation represents a performance-decreasing 
accounting technique for the venturer. 
The reporting of JCEs has always been a controversial accounting issue. 
Previous literature mainly focused on the market consequences deriving from the 
alternative reporting method, although providing mixed evidence. Few studies show 
that Equity method statements is associated with superior risk relevance in explaining 
bond ratings but not price volatility (Kothavala, 2003) and decline in information 
asymmetry (Lim et al., 2003). Differently a greater number of empirical results 
highlight that Proportionate consolidation presents a more comprehensive view of the 
venturer financial position and of its incumbent risks and rewards, appears more 
useful in predicting future returns on shareholders (Graham et al., 2003), provides 
creditors with better information, when the venturer guarantees the JCEs's debts 
(Stoltzfus & Epps, 2005) and avoids the lost of forecasting and relevant information 
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(Soonawalla, 2006; Bauman, 2007). More recently, Lourenço et al. (2012) show that 
the elimination of the Proportionate consolidation would deprive investors of a set of 
information on recognized assets and liabilities, which might be not comparable to 
the information presented in the notes.  
Differently, relatively little attention has been dedicated to the determinants for the 
accounting treatments of JCEs. Lourenço and Curto (2010) provide evidence that an 
organizational determinant plays an important role in the management decision to 
report JCEs. They find out that, in the UK context, the type Link influences the 
management choice to use the Proportionate consolidation. Later, Giner and Veron 
(2012) report that the interdependence of the activities between the entities, the 
assets specificity and the firms’ size are positively associated with the adoption of the 
Proportionate method in Spanish firms, while leverage is negatively associated. 
Therefore, we still notice a very poor literature on the determinants behind the 
managerial choice of the Equity method for the accounting of JCEs. In addition, these 
previous studies cannot be generalized to other countries with specific market and 
governance characteristics.  
Some distinctive features of the Italian institutional setting make the investigation of 
the accounting choices for JCEs particularly appealing for a number of reasons. First, 
a previous study observed a medium level of comparability among Italian consolidated 
financial statements in the reporting of JCEs (Catuogno & Allini, 2011). Second, there 
is a need for more accounting choice studies, and specifically those on JCEs, for 
countries characterized by predominance of small and medium size listed companies, 
concentrated ownership and debt financing as the main source of capital (Di Pietra et al., 
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2008; Jaggi et al., in press). Third, Italy may be considered as representative of a family 
business environment in which family members play a relevant role in ownership, 
management and board composition (Miller et al., 2013). 
The paper is framed in the contracting-based theory, coherently with previous studies 
on the accounting choices determinants (Missonier-Piera, 2004; Astami & Tower, 
2006; Quagli & Avallone, 2010; Waweru et al., 2011) and aims at investigating factors 
that influence managers’ decision to use the Equity method for the accounting of 
JCEs. 
The data source consists of 257 Italian firm-year observations having JCEs in their 
financial statements for the period 2008-2012.  
Using a mixed-effects logistic model, we show that contractual efficiency and 
managerial opportunism drive the Equity method choice. After controlling for several 
variables, the empirical results highlight that while the growing family influence 
fosters the opportunistic selection of the Equity method, the monitoring role played 
by dominant shareholders, as well as by bondholders and related market authorities, 
may discourage the use of the performance-improving accounting technique. 
Conversely, neither leverage nor size seems to influence the choice, revealing the 
irrelevance of the usual relations in the Italian setting.  
The research makes a contribution to the accounting choice literature and has both 
theoretical and practical implications. First, we answer to the general call for more 
researches on the accounting for JCEs in order to provide an accurate understanding 
supporting investors who must interpret financial statement numbers while making 
economic decisions (Alexander et al., 2012). Second, we add knowledge on the 
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accounting choice literature bringing evidence on the extent to which managers 
exercise discretion to improve their wealth or mitigate conflicts of interests among 
contracting parties. Third, we provide an original extension of the contracting-based 
theory by  exploring accounting choice governance determinants. 
Furthermore, we complement the few previous researches formulating hypotheses in 
terms the impact of managerial choices on profitability and leverage ratios (Whittred 
& Chan, 1992; Cotter, 1999; Missonier-Piera, 2004). Also, we address the 
international standard setting debate by providing results that witness the managerial 
opportunism in the accounting for JCEs by the Equity method. In this regard our 
study is timely since it casts doubts on the IASB decision to eliminate the Proportionate 
consolidation. 
The remaining paper unfolds as follow. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature and formulates hypothesis, sections 3 and 4 present the research design and 
results, section 5 discusses evidence and section 6 concludes and suggest directions 
for future research.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses development  
 
The contracting-based theory assumes that managers select particular accounting 
procedures either efficiently, to attain corporate objectives (namely maximize firm 
value or minimize political exposure and agency costs), or opportunistically, to 
manipulate earnings and reflect accounting numbers for their own benefit (Watts & 
Zimmerman 1978; 1986; Holthausen, 1990). The extent of efficiency and opportunism 
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depend on the monitoring devices over managerial accounting discretion.  
The efficient contracting view predicts that accounting practices evolve to mitigate 
contracting costs by addressing potential conflicts of interests between types of 
parties. The opportunistic view suggests that managers choose accounting policies for 
their own benefit which depends on debt covenants, political costs and bonus plans 
(Watts & Zimmerman 1978; 1986; Holthausen, 1990).  
Most of the empirical studies on the accounting choices mainly focus on the 
consequences on income and supports incentives to choose income-increasing 
accounting methods related to leverage and bonus plans (Abdel-Khalik, 1985) while 
incentives to choose income-decreasing accounting methods related to political 
visibility and taxes minimizing purposes (Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014; Karampinis & 
Hevas, 2013).  
Our paper builds on the contracting-based theory as a focal point to support the 
discussion on the managerial choice of the Equity method. Furthermore, we provide 
an original extension of the accounting choice literature through the exploration of 
some governance variables in addition to those usually employed for the debt 
covenant and the political cost hypothesis. In this perspective, we predict that 
leverage, corporate bond, size, dominant shareholder and family influence are 
systematically related to the choice of the Equity method in the accounting for JCEs, 
as the opportunistic accounting technique that improves firm’s leverage and 
profitability.  
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2.1. Leverage  
 
Prior literature links financial debt and accounting policy choice because debt 
covenants are usually based on reported accounting numbers, and violations of debt 
covenants imposes costs (Dhaliwal et al. 1982; Holtausen & Leftwick, 1983).  
Accounting decisions are influenced by creditors’ use of accounting data in their loan 
agreements and lending decisions. Managers aiming at reducing debt covenant costs 
and improving firm financial position may adopt the accounting methods that display 
favorable financial statements in terms of creditworthiness. Furthermore, managers 
may try to improve the firm’s financial flexibility in order to prevent the reporting of a 
position of financial distress. These considerations become more relevant as the firm 
financial debt increases (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 1990).  
Empirical tests of economic consequences theories reveal recurrent  associations 
between accounting choices and firm leverage, a proxy for the proximity to violation 
and for debt covenant costs  (Fields et al., 2001). The assumption that the violation of 
debt covenants is positively associated with leverage leads to suppose that managers 
should have incentives to choose performance-improving accounting techniques to 
ensure that they comply with the covenants imposed by lenders and avoid renegotiation 
costs (Beatty &Weber, 2003).  
The empirical evidence is mixed. Some results find that leverage is not a factor in 
explaining the choice of accounting methods (Markarian et al., 2008; Quagli & 
Avallone, 2010; Aitken & Loftus, 2009; Missonier‐Piera, 2004; Waweru et al, 2011). 
By contrast, others reveal significant association with accounting choices (Othman & 
Zeghal, 2006; Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011; Astami &Tower, 2006; Lourenco & Curto, 
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2010; Jaggi & Leung, 2003). 
Since a venturer closer to violating debt covenants is more likely to choose an 
accounting policy that decreases leverage to reduce debt covenant costs, and bearing in 
mind that the Equity method carries a decrease in leverage, a positive relationship 
between leverage and the choice of Equity method is predicted.  
Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H1. The more the venturers rely on financial debts, the more likely their managers 
will choose the performance-improving technique for the accounting of JCEs. 
 
2.2. Corporate bond 
 
Despite the large extent of bank financing, further attention should be directed to the 
use of public debt by Italian firms, due to the peculiar characteristics of corporate 
bonds market, especially with regard to supervision and negotiation costs. This leads 
to offsetting arguments in terms of accounting policy choices. 
On the one hand, many scholars hypothesize that the higher contracting costs, in the 
form of bond covenant limitations on leverage (a typical type of public debt 
restriction), provides additional incentive for managers to choose accounting 
techniques aimed at  avoiding constraints (Beneish & Press, 1993; Labelle, 1990; 
Leftwich, 1981). In particular, since financial ratios are used in the definition of bond 
covenants, the selection of performance-improving accounting techniques can 
decrease the probability of lending agreements violation (Thornton &Bryant, 1986; 
Demerjian, 2011).  
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On the other hand, a political visibility argument, similar to that originally proposed 
by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), may also apply. In this perspective, Italian firms 
issuing corporate bonds undergo the monitoring of the National Commission for 
Listed Companies and the Stock Exchange (CONSOB), the authority whose aim is the 
supervision for the safeguard of investors and the transparency of financial market. 
Likewise, Borsa Italiana – the other market authority for listed companies - carries 
out a constant monitoring on bond exchanges, with the possibility to interrupt 
continuous trading, when particular market trends occur. In this perspective, 
regulatory agencies are likely to impose more stringent inspection on the managerial 
opportunism of firms using public debt. Addressing a gap in the empirical research on 
accounting choice and the use of public debt, we employ the issuance of corporate 
bond as a variable for political visibility and hypothesize that venturers issuing 
corporate bonds are more vulnerable to enhanced scrutiny by market monitors and 
regulators. In particular, the monitoring role played by bondholders and related market 
authorities may discourage the managerial opportunistic use of the Equity method that 
produces a cosmetic improvement in both profitability and leverage ratios. Hence, we 
predict a negative relationship between the use of corporate bonds and the choice of 
Equity method and assume that: 
H2. In venturers issuing corporate bond, managers are less likely to choose the 
performance-improving technique for the accounting of JCEs. 
 
2.3. Size  
 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) find that firm size and leverage are the only two 
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significant variables explaining choices of accounting techniques in their review of studies 
on the economic consequences of accounting policies. They report systematic 
associations between accounting choices and firm size.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) predict that the political visibility of a firm affects its 
potential contracting costs. The magnitude of such costs is highly related to firm size, 
being size a proxy variable for political attention. In fact, large companies are usually 
subject to intense scrutiny. The visibility of large companies, especially in terms of 
available wealth, tends more easily to attract the attention of numerous stakeholders, 
including, politicians regulatory bodies, customers, and competitors (Waweru et al., 
2011).  
Larger firms are more likely to face political exposure penalties than smaller firms. 
Consequently, managers of large politically sensitive firms are more inclined to make 
accounting choices so as to avoid or minimize political costs and political pressures 
(Missonier-Piera, 2004).  
The empirical evidence, however, does not systematically report an association between 
the accounting policy choices and the political cost hypothesis. Some studies reveal the 
existence of a positive relation with size (Jaggi & Leung, 2003; Waweru et al., 2011). 
By contrast, other research shows no significant association (Labelle, 1990; Missonier- 
Piera, 2004; Astami & Tower, 2006; Lourenço & Curto, 2010).  
Since Proportionate consolidation is likely to make the venturer’s size higher, it may be 
that the expected costs of government scrutiny are also increased by this choice. 
Assuming that managers of larger venturers may have incentives to report interests in 
JCEs by the Equity method in order to avoid a significant change in the venturer’s size, 
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we predict a positive relationship with the Equity method.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H3. The larger the venturers, the more likely their managers will choose the 
performance-improving technique for the accounting of JCEs. 
 
2.4. Dominant shareholder 
 
There is considerable evidence that large shareholders play an active role in the 
corporate governance process (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Managers of firms having a 
dominant shareholder may experience less discretionary power (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011). That is, ownership concentration is 
likely to reduce agency problems by increasing the level of monitoring. The ownership 
concentration over one or few individuals, leads to a more efficient and direct 
supervision on managerial behaviour and prevents opportunistic selection of 
accounting techniques for their personal benefit. According to this view, it is therefore 
highly expected that managers of blockholder-dominated firms are less likely to 
choose accounting techniques that improve the firm profitability, even when their 
compensation is linked to performance. 
On the bases of these premises, several scholars have tested the relation between 
ownership concentration and managerial discretion. Findings, however, appear to be 
mixed. Whilst some authors find a negative correlation (Yeo et al., 2002; Missonier -
Piera, 2004; Astami &Tower, 2006), other studies report a non-significant association 
(García‐Meca&Sánchez‐Ballesta, 2009; Davidson et al., 2005; Waweru et al., 2011).  
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We assume that the presence of a dominant shareholder can be seen as an efficient 
monitoring mechanism to constrain managerial discretional use of the Equity method 
that opportunistically improves profitability and leverage ratios. Therefore, a negative 
relationship between dominant shareholder and the choice of Equity method is 
predicted and we assume that:  
H4. The higher the presence of a dominant shareholder over the venturers, the less 
likely their managers will choose the performance-improving technique for the 
accounting of JCEs. 
 
2.5. Family influence  
 
A focus on family firms is timely because of their pervasiveness in the Italian Stock 
Exchange (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Similarly to other countries with poor financial 
economies, in Italy the control over firms is delegated to wealthy and well-established 
families (Pagano et al., 1996). Controlling families are usually involved in the board of 
directors or even in the CEO positions (Markarian et al., 2008). Nevertheless, in spite 
of the growing attention for family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005; Poutziouris et al., 
1997), we still notice very limited research on the influence exerted by the family on 
the accounting choices. Families are a unique class of shareholders since they typically 
hold undiversified portfolios, show concern over firm and family reputation, and have 
substantially long term investment horizons. Family influence can occur via the 
extent of its ownership, governance, and management involvement in the firm 
(Astrachan et al., 2002).  
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Two different sides of the optimal contracting view are often provided to predict 
managerial behavior in family firms. 
According to the alignment perspective, the family involvement is beneficial as it 
mitigate the overall agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Chrisman et al 2004). This alignment reduces managerial incentives to report 
accounting information that deviate from the underlying firm’s economic 
performance (Salvato & Moores, 2010). 
By contrast, the entrenchment perspective (Morck et al., 1988; Morck & Yeung, 2003) 
predicts that family involvement has the potential to increase agency threats as 
dominant inside shareholders can expropriate the minorities’ wealth. This is 
especially true when governance mechanisms do not work properly (Catuogno et al., 
in press). Because of these problems, family firms will gain performance benefits from 
the use of pay incentives and other cost control devices (Schulze et al. 2003).  
The results are contradictory.  Some authors document that financial reporting in 
family firms is less prone to managerial opportunism (Prencipe et al., 2011, Cascino et 
al., 2010). Similarly, other studies report that managerial opportunism decreases with 
managerial ownership – a proxy for family firms (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Warfield et al., 
1995) – as the insider ownership implies the alignment of interests between 
management and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, studies on 
various settings confirm the entrenchment effect of family ownership (Sánchez-
Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; Yang, 2010; Cornette et al., 
2008; Gopalan & Sudarshan, 2012).  
We believe that the growing family influence encourages the managerial opportunistic 
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selection of the Equity method that, improving profitability and leverage ratios, also 
improve their own compensation. Therefore we predict a positive relationship between 
family influence and the choice of Equity method and assume that:  
H5. The higher the venturers’ family influence, the more likely their managers will 
choose the performance-improving technique for the accounting of JCEs. 
 
3. Research design   
 
Our research relies on firms listed in the Italian Stock Exchange. We hand collected 
data from the firms’ website and from the Mediobanca database. 
The sample selection procedure starts with the universe of Italian listed firms. We 
exclude financial service firms for their different accounting regulation, then we 
selected only those firms that report interests in JCEs in their financial statement for 
fiscal year-ends ranging from 2008, the start of the crisis when market conditions 
deteriorated, to 2012, the last year before IFRS 11 adoption. Further, we exclude non-
operating companies as they were not representative and companies resulting from 
extraordinary transactions in order to keep the sample homogeneous.  
The Table 1 shows the sample distribution of venturers by fiscal years. The final 
sample consists of 257 firm-year observations. 
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Table 1  
Full sample composition 
 
Firms Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011  Year 2012 
Total listed Italian firms 300 296 296 292 285 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate (80) (75) (76) (79) (78) 
Industrial firms 220 221 220 213 207 
Firms holding interests in JCEs 44 51 63 73 77 
Firms excluded (3) (9) (23) (13) (4) 
Total sample  41 42 40 60 74 
In order to test the hypothesis described in Section 2.2, some variables are identified 
and computed.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the reporting method for interests in JCEs used by 
venturers in their annual financial statement (Reporting method). This variable 
assumes two values: 1 if the venturer choses to report interests in JCEs by the Equity 
method (the performance-improving accounting technique); 0 if the venturer choses 
to report interests in JCEs by Proportionate consolidation (the performance-
decreasing accounting technique) 
 
Independent variables 
 
Data used to compute indipendent variables are collected from the venturer’s 
financial statement. 
Leverage is a proxy for the indebtness, measured by long-term financial liabilities to 
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Equity (Astami & Tower, 2006) (Leverage); 
Corporate bond is a dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the venturer reports own 
corporate bonds in its financial statement; value 0 if no bonds are issued (Bond).  
Size is measured by logarithm of total sales (Patelli & Prencipe, 2007) (Size); 
Dominant shareholder is a dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the ultimate 
shareholder owns more than 50% of the total voting rights; value 0, otherwise 
(Dominant). The international accounting literature generally considers the threshold 
of 10% or more of the voting rights as controlling shareholder (Dhaliwal et al 1982; 
Chen&Jaggi, 2000; Park & Shin, 2004). Since scholars report a more concentrated 
ownership structure for the Italian listed firms, where the mean and the median 
concentration approximate to the 51% of total voting rights (Zattoni, 1999; Cascino et 
al., 2010), we propose an alternative and more stringent threshold to define the 
dominant shareholder. Moreover, our proxy complies with the definition of the de 
jure control. Family influcence is captured by F-Pec score (F-Pec).  
Consistently with Astrachan et al. (2002), we calculate the F-Pec as follows: 
 
FI = (EQfam/EQtot) + (BoDfam/BoDtot) + (SBfam/SBtot) 
 
The first addend of the FI formulation defines the Equity share owned by the family 
(EQfam) over total Equity (EQtot); the second defines the percentage of family 
members (or members interconnected with the family) on the board of directors 
(BoDfam) over the total (BoDtot); and the third addend represents the percentage of 
family members (or members interconnected with the family) (SBfam) over the whole 
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supervisory board (SBtot). 
The primary advantage of the F-PEC score is its ability to group into a single index a 
series of dimensions suggested in the previous literature, namely family ownership 
and family involvement into board of director and top management.  
Several studies applied, tested and validated this measure (Jaskiewicz et al., 2005; 
Caselli & Gatti, 2006; Giovannini, 2010).  
 
Control variables 
 
We consider two control variables: type of JCE and sector. 
Lourenço and Curto (2010) find that the type of JCEs, as classified by Hennart (1998), 
plays an important role in the managerial decision to report interests in JCEs in UK. 
In ordet to control if this organizational aspect affects the accounting choice, we 
include  a dummy variable that assumes values 1 if the majority of JCEs is Link (Link 
venturers) and 0 if the majority of JCEs is Scale (Scale venturers) (Type). 
Similarly to Lourenço and Curto (2010), we collect information on each JCE’s 
business, as well as the venturers’ business from their Notes to financial statement, or 
from their website. When the business of the venturer is complementary to that of 
other venturers, the JCE is a case of heterogeneous cooperation and is therefore 
classified as a Link JCE. When the venturers undertake a similar business, the JCE is 
a case of homogeneous cooperation and is classified as a Scale JCE.  
For Sector we use the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC code). However, it has 
been re-categorized in three groups: Manufacturing (variable: Sector 1); 
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Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services (variable: 
Sector 2); all remaining sectors (Other). This operation is a necessary data pre-
processing step in order to obtain consistent estimate of parameters.  
We proceed with a preliminary descriptive analysis and then we run a logistic mixed 
effects regression. Given the nature of the data set, it is not convenient to proceed to 
statistically formal uni-variate comparisons because the statistical units are not 
independent and any formal hypothesis testing procedure returns uninterpretable 
results.  
For this reason, after a brief look at the data, we will directly proceed with the logistic 
mixed effects regression, which belongs to a category of models that take in account 
the presence of repeated measurement of the variables and the temporal component. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
The sample includes both venturers that reports interests in JCEs by the Equity 
method (132 over 257) and by Proportionate consolidation (125 over 257), as shown in 
the Table 2. 
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Table 2  
Firms applying Equity versus Proportionate method by Year 
 
 
The number of observations per accounting period is equally distributed across 
Proportionate and Equity method except in 2012, where the application of Equity 
method prevails (46 over 74). The smallest number of observations occurred for the 
fiscal year 2010.  
In our sample, firms issuing bonds are at least 50% for the years 2008, 2009 and 
2010. (Table 3):  
 
Table 3  
Industry composition  
 
Classification 
Full Sample Equity  Proportionate  
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
01_09 
Agriculture,Forestry, 
Fishing 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10_14 Mining 5 1.9 4 3.0 1 0.8 
15_17 Construction 18 7.0 1 0.8 17 13.6 
Year 
Full Sample Equity Method Proportionate Method 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
2008 41 16.0 22 16.7 19 15.2 
2009 42 16.3 15 11.4 27 21.6 
2010 40 15.6 16 12.1 24 19.2 
2011 60 23.3 33 25.0 27 21.6 
2012 74 28.8 46 34.8 28 22.4 
Total 257  132  125  
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20_39 Manufacturing 136 52.9 85 64.4 51 40.8 
40_49 
Trasportation, 
Communication, Electric, 
Gas, Sanitary Service 
79 30.7 34 25.8 45 36.0 
50_51 Wholesale Trade 4 1.6 4 3.0 0 0 
52_59 Retail Trade 6 2.3 1 0.8 5 4.0 
60_67 
Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
70_89 Services 9 3.5 3 2.3 6 4.8 
91_99 Public Administration 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 257  132  125  
 
The Table 4 reveals that companies are mainly concentrated in two sectors, 
Manufacturing (136 over 257) and Trasportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary Service Industry,  respectively (79 over 257), and the rest is spread among the 
other sectors. Moreover the Equity method subsample has a higher proportion of firms 
that belongs to Manufacturing industry (85 over 136), which by the way is the most 
relevant sector in Italy.  
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Table 4  
Venturers reporting bonds in their financial statements 
 
Sample 
Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011 Year 2012 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Firms issuing 
bonds 
21 51.2 25 59.5 28 70 25 41.7 28 37.8 
bonds/ total 
liabilities”>20% 
9 42.9 11 44 10 35.7 13 52 13 46.4 
Total firms 41  42  40  60  74  
 
There are 5 categorical and 3 numerical variables.  
The Table 5 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the numerical 
explanatory variables. “Size” is captured in logarithmic terms. 
The Table 6 shows the correlation matrix among the numerical variables. Numerical 
variables are really poorly correlated. It means that there are no problems of 
collinearity in the specification of the model. “Leverage” and “F-Pec” are positively 
skewed, as well as “Size” present a negative skewness.  
We performed also the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS) to check the normality of this 
distributions. The Table 7 displays that none of this three variables is normally 
distributed. 
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Table 5 
The descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
 
Variables  N. of firms Mean Min Max  SD 
Leverage 257 0.876 -6.24 14.811 1.487 
Size 257 5.157 -4.001 8.489 1.274 
F-Pec 257 0.408 0.000 1.329 0.423 
N: sample size 
Leverage: total book value of debt divided by book value of Equity, Size: log total sales;  F PEC: FI = (EQfam/EQtot) + (BoDfam/BoDtot) 
+ (SBfam/SBtot) 
 
Table 6  
Correlation Matrix 
 
 Leverage Size F-Pec 
Leverage 1 0.159 0.109 
Size  1 -0.261 
F-Pec   1 
 
Table 7 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test versus normal distribution 
 
Variables  KS statistics P-value 
Leverage 4.333 0.000 
Size 1.365 0.000 
F-Pec 5.055 0.000 
 
The Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the same variables within each year. 
Looking at the table, the quantities do not change over the years, except for the 
skewness of the “Size” variable that becomes negative starting by 2011. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics for numerical variables over 2008-2012 
 
           Year Leverage Size F-Pec 
2008 
N 41 41 41 
Min 0.000 3.030 0.000 
Max 10.330 8.460 1.220 
Mean 1.048 5.463 0.417 
Dev. St 1.709 1.262 0.436 
Skewness 4.302 0.558 0.260 
2009 
N 42 42 42 
Min 0.000 2.760 0.000 
Max 3.550 8.450 1.190 
Mean 0.821 5.263 0.408 
Dev. St 0.785 1.094 0.435 
Skewness 1.691 0.583 0.288 
2010 
 
N 40 40 40 
Min 0.000 3.550 0.000 
Max 5.730 8.490 1.050 
Mean 0.817 5.464 .387 
Dev. st 0.943 1.219 0.403 
Skewness 3.835 0.531 0.277 
2011 
N 60 60 60 
Min 0.000 2.940 0.000 
Max 6.410 7.660 1.330 
Mean 0.859 5.143 0.387 
Dev. st 0.978 1.025 0.418 
Skewness 3.393 -0.154 0.364 
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2012 
N 74 74 74 
Min -6.240 -4.000 0.000 
Max 14.810 7.710 1.330 
Mean 0.859 4.773 0.432 
Dev. st 2.132 1.499 0.434 
Skewness 3.613 -2.864 0.260 
 
The Table 9 below shows the descriptive statistics of the categorical variables.  
The “Reporting method”, “Dominant” and “Type” variables are quite equally 
distributed.  
Firms issuing bonds are approximately 25%. Companies operate prevalently in Sector 
1. These proportions are quite constant over the years, with some differences due to 
the unbalanced composition of the data set. Indeed, within each year the number of 
companies varies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Behind the Equity Method for Interests in Jointly Controlled Entities in Italy 
 
105 
 
 
 
Table 9 
The descriptive statistics of the categorical variables 
 
Variables Categories Proportion 
Reporting method 
Equity 0.514 
Proportionate 0.486 
Bond 
Absence 0.747 
Presence 0.253 
Dominant 
No 0.447 
Yes 0.553 
Type 
Link 0.455 
Scale 0.555 
Sector 
Sector 1 0.529 
Sector 2 0.308 
Other 0.163 
Reporting Method: venturer’s reporting method 1=Equity; 0=Proportionate; Bond: 1= if the venturer issues bonds and 0= otherwise; 
Dominat: 1= if the ultimate shareholder owns more than 50% of the voting rights;  0=otherwise; Type: the nature of JCEs, 1= if the 
majority of the venturer’s JCE are Scale, 0= otherwise; Sector: 1=  Manufacturing and Transportation, 2= Communications, Electric, Gas 
& Sanitary Services; 3= otherwise. 
 
 
4.2. Regression model  
 
The Logistic regression is the appropriate methodology when multiple accounting 
choices are investigated.  
Logistic regression (or Logit regression) belongs to the category of the Generalized 
Linear Models (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989).  It is assumed that the response variable 
follows a binomial distribution. The outcome of the logistic regression is an estimate 
of the conditional probability of success (Agresti, 2013). 
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Nevertheless, such a model generally assumes that all statistical units are independent 
of each other and for this reason they are also called fixed effects models. This 
assumption means that fixed effects models are not suitable for analysis of correlated 
data structures,  as in the case of longitudinal data analysis in which there are 
repeated observations of the same variables over a period of time.  
In our case we have repeated measures of firms over five years, with a binary outcome 
variable. Given the structure of the data, a standard logistic regression (or, 
equivalently, a GLM with a logit link function) is not appropriate. We chose a 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with the logit function as link function (or 
mixed-effects logistic model) (Lee et al., 2006). 
The GLMMs belong to the family of the mixed models, in the sense that they are able 
to take in account both the fixed and the random effects. Generally speaking fixed 
effects are constant across individuals (overall mean effects), and random effects can 
vary.   
In our case, we chose to estimate a GLMM with random intercept (random 
components) relative to the companies and the year. The coefficients of the fixed 
effects are interpreted as in a standard logistic regression, namely as the logarithm of 
the odds ratios. The Equation model is: 
,Year2012Year2011Year2010Year2009Sector(2)Sector(1)
TypeFPecDominantSizeBondLeverage)(logit
121110987
6543210


Z
Dependent
                                                 
(1) 
where π indicates the probability of success, 𝐙  is the design matrix for the random 
effects and 𝛄  is the vector of the random effects (the random complement to the fixed 
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β). Note that, given the nature of the data set, the variable Year is treated as a factor. 
This mean that the conditional probability (Pr) is estimated in this way: 
 
)Year2012Year2011
Year2010Year2009Sector(2)Sector(1)Type
FPecDominantSizeBondLeverageexp(1
)Year2012Year2011
Year2010Year2009Sector(2)Sector(1)Type
FPecDominantSizeBondLeverageexp(
)Pr(
1211
109876
543210
1211
109876
543210






Z
Z






 EquityDependent
                                   (2) 
Table 10 shows the regression analysis using four different models (a, b, c, d).  
Model a is the so-called baseline (or trivial) model. It is used to check the statistical 
significance of other models. Progressively, model b includes the predictors, model c 
adds the control variables and model d adds the years. Table 10 shows also the 
variance of the random intercept. 
The first model (a) contains the intercept as fixed effect, and the factors Year and 
Firm as random effects. The variance for Year is equal to zero, hence there is no 
change over time in the intercept of the model. The variance for the factor “Firm” is 
always higher than zero which means that companies have different intercepts.  
By looking at the model b, the regression coefficients are significant respectively for 
variables “Bond”, “Dominant” and “F-Pec”; in particular the bond issue is a highly 
significant factor for the management’s choice with a p- value of .000.  
“Bond” and “Dominant” are binary variables and their sign is negative. This means 
that by moving from the baseline category of both variables  – respectively “no bond 
issue” and “no dominant shareholder holding more than 50% of the voting rights” – 
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to the assumed category  – respectively “bond issue” and “shareholder holding more 
than 50% of the voting rights” – the probability of using “Equity method” decreases.  
The “F-Pec” variable is numerical and its coefficient is positive with a p-value of .094. 
It means that the higher is its value, the higher is the probability of adopting “Equity”.  
This interpretation is valid on average, namely without taking into account the 
random effects. Moreover the model b reveals that “Leverage” and “Size” do not help 
in explaining the managerial selection of Equity method. 
In the model c we add the control variables. It can be noted that the variable “Type” is 
significant with a positive coefficient (p-value equal to .000).  
The baseline category is “Link”. It means that by moving from “Link” to “Scale” the 
probability of using “Equity” increases. The type of JCE plays an important role in the 
management decision to report interests in JCEs (Mian & Smith, 1990; Lourenço & 
Curto, 2010). “Sector” is not a significant predictor.  
The results of the model c (with all explanatory and control variables) show that the 
“Dominant” and “F-Pec” variables have highly significant coefficients if compared 
with the model b (respectively, p-value of .007, and of .041), with the same sign.  
Lastly, model d includes also the temporal component, which is not significant as 
confirmed by the zero variance of the random component. The model can be 
interpreted as Model c.  
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Table 10 
Multiple regression results 
 
Pred Sign Model a Model b Model c Model d 
  St.e p St.e p St.e p St.e p 
Intercept  1.601 
 
0.039 
5.286 
 
 
0.057 
-0.579 
 
0.806 
-1.019 
 
0.685 
  (0.778)  (2.778)  (2.361)  (2.514)  
Leverage +   
0.817 
 
 
0.219 
0.809 
 
 
0.124 
0.842 
 
 
0.120 
    (0.666)  (0.526)  (0.541)  
Bond -   
-5.921 
 
 
0.000*** 
-3.640 
 
 
0.000*** 
-3.429 
 
 
0.001*** 
    (1.463)  (1.081)  (1.108)  
Size +   
-0.337 
 
 
0.497 
-0.041 
 
 
0.916 
0.013 
 
 
0.972 
    (0.497)  (0.391)  (0.399)  
Dominant -   
-3.563 
 
 
0.026** 
-3.001 
 
 
0.007*** 
-2.908 
 
 
0.009*** 
    (1.606)  (1.119)  (1.113)  
F-Pec +   
2.952 
 
 
0.094** 
2.088 
 
 
0.041** 
1.983 
 
 
0.047** 
    (1.764)  (1.025)  (1.007)  
Type +     
6.446 
 
 
0.000*** 
6.386 
 
 
0.000*** 
      (1.099)  (1.104)  
Sector (1) 
 
    
0.694 
 
 
0.641 
0.813 
 
 
0.579 
      (1.489)  (1.499)  
Sector (2) 
 
    
-1.363 
 
 
0.363 
-1.326 
 
 
0.376 
      (1.499)  (1.498)  
Year 2009 
 
      
-1.266 
 
 
0.292 
        (1.203)  
Year 2010 
 
      
-0.241 
 
 
0.842 
        (1.213)  
Year 2011 
 
      
-0.172 
 
(1.033) 
 
0.867 
 
Chapter 3. Behind the Equity Method for Interests in Jointly Controlled Entities in Italy 
 
110 
 
          
Year 2012 
 
      
0.4063 
 
 
0.671 
        (0.958)  
Log-
likelihood 
 
-121.119 -107.641 -79.076 -77.752 
Deviance  242.238 215.280 158.153 155.506 
Cox & Snell 
Pseudo R2 
 
- 0.099 0.279 0.285 
Negelkerke 
Pseudo R2 
 
- 0.163 0.457 0.469 
Random 
effects 
variance 
(Firm) 
 
40.748 34.254 8.866 8.661 
Random 
effects 
variance 
(Year) 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively 
 
As these models are nested models, we can perform an ANOVA test to check 
statistically the significance of the model. Once two models are compared, the null 
hypothesis is that they are equivalents. If we reject the null hypothesis, the model with 
a higher number of estimated coefficients can be considered as better than the other. 
In the Table 11, we note that Model c and d are equivalent (the p-value associated with 
the comparison between Model c and d is equal about to 61%).   
These results indicate that the reporting method selected by managers is influenced 
by some determinants. In particular, “Bond”, “Dominant”, “F-Pec” and “Type” 
variables are highly predictive. 
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Table 11 
Anova tests 
 
                          Anova tests Model a Model b Model c Model d 
Model a 
𝜒 2 Statistic - 26.958 84.085 86.732 
Degrees of freedom     - 5 8 12 
P-value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model b 
𝜒 2 Statistic - - 57.128 59.775 
Degrees of 
freedom 
- - 3 7 
P-value - - 0.000 0.000 
Model c 
𝜒 2 Statistic - - - 2.646 
Degrees of 
freedom 
- - - 4 
P-value - - - 0.618 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Our empirical findings highlight that the monitoring role played by dominant 
shareholders, as well as by bondholders and related market authorities, limits the 
managerial opportunism in the adoption of the Equity method for the accounting of 
JCEs, whereas the growing family influence fosters the selection of the performance-
improving accounting technique. Conversely, neither leverage nor size seems to 
influence the choice, revealing the irrelevance of the usual relations in the Italian 
context. These outcomes provide the following evidences and implications. 
In terms of explanatory factors, consistent with previous studies on accounting choice 
(Markarian et al., 2008; Aitken & Loftus, 2009; Missonier-Piera 2004; Waweru et al, 
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2011) we find that leverage is an insignificant predictor of managerial decision to 
report JCEs by the Equity method, although the direction of the coefficient is positive, 
as hypothesized. Highly leveraged venturers are not significantly associated with the 
performance-improving accounting technique that would positively impact leverage 
ratio and accordingly firm’s creditworthiness. Thereby, the hypothesys H1 is not 
supported and our finding differ from those of prior studies in dissimilar institutional 
environments (Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011, Astami & Tower, 
2006; Lourenço & Curto, 2010; Jaggi &Leung, 2003). Due to the close relationship 
that may exist between Italian managers and debt holders, especially banks, our result 
may reflect the presence of less restrictive debt covenant constraints compared to 
those of other countries. Or even the existence of constraints that are not related to 
financial statements numbers but to private information (for instance professional 
assessment) may contribute to the irrelevance of the accounting method choice. 
With regard to the dummy variable corporate bond, the regression analysis shows 
that it significantly explains the managerial choice to account for JCEs by the Equity 
method. Thus, the hypothesys H2 is supported. Venturers that use corporate bonds as 
a surce of financing are more vulnerable to political scrutiny. Our result provide 
evidence that the monitoring role played by bondholders and related regulatory market 
authorities discourages the managerial use of the Equity method that opportunistically 
produces an improvement in profitability and leverage ratio. To the best of our 
knowledge, we fill a gap in the empirical research on accounting choice, since it is one 
of the first papers that assumes a variable related to the use of public debt to explain 
the choice of accounting principles drawing from the political visibility rather than the 
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bond covenant hypothesis. 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, when we use size as a proxy variable for political 
visibility, the hypothesys H3 is rejected, even if the “model d” exhibits the expected 
sign. This result is consistent with previous research (Labelle, 1990; Missonier, 2004; 
Astami&Tower, 2006; Lourenço & Curto, 2010). The finding of this study are 
inconsistent with the political cost hypothesis, to the extent that firm’s total sales do 
not explain the accounting policy choice for the Italian listed companies. 
With respect to the dominant variable, the evidence shows a significant negative 
relationship between large block holdings and the choice of the Equity method. The 
hypothesys H4 is confirmed. This is consistent with the role of a large shareholder 
acting as monitor, which suggests less opportunity for accounting manipulation. 
Indeed, ultimate shareholders have the incentives to monitor management and 
enough voting rights to oust management through takeovers. Our findings also 
confirm previous studies (Yeo et al., 2002; Missonier, 2004; Astami & Tower, 2006; 
Giner &Veron, 2012). 
Lastly, as far the F-Pec variable is concerned, the regression result exhibits a positive 
and strong relationship between family influence and the choice of Equity method. The 
hypothesys H5 is supported. With the growing family involvment in ownership and 
control, managers face less pressure from capital markets. This lack of market 
discipline leads insiders to make accounting choices that reflect personal motives, 
managing accounting numbers so as to increase their performance-based 
compensations. 
Our findings confirm the entrenchment effect of family ownership, coherently with 
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the previous evidence (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007; Gabrielsen et al., 
2002; Yang, 2010; Cornette et al., 2008; Gopalan & Sudarshan, 2012).  
With reference to the control variables, the regression analysis displays that the type 
of JCEs is highly and positivly correlated to the Equity method. This result means that 
the venturer is more likely to employ the Equity method when the majority of its JCEs 
are cases of Scale cooperation, consistenly with a recent study in the UK setting 
(Lourenço and Curto, 2010). Conversly we find no industry effect. 
 
6. Conclusion and directions for future research 
 
In the frame of the contracting-based theory, this article investigates the determinants 
behind the choice of Equity method for the accounting of JCEs in Italy, as the 
opportunistic accounting technique that improves firm’s leverage and profitability. 
We develop an explanatory model following the theoretical framework derived from 
the accounting choice theory where contractual efficiency and managerial 
opportunism reasons could explain the choice the Equity method. We run a mixed-
effects logistic model which takes into account the Equity method as a baseline 
outcome category. We also control for the type of JCEs and the sector, whose effects 
are generally relevant. 
Our empirical results highlight that the managerial opportunism explains the 
selection of the Equity method at the growing of the family influence, whereas the 
contractual efficiency rationale, that increases with the monitoring role played by 
concentrated shareholders, bondholders and related market authorities, discourages 
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the use of the performance-improving accounting technique. Conversely, the effects of 
leverage and size seem to be irrelevant for the Italian context.  
Our paper provides several contributions to the accounting choice literature and has a 
number of theoretical implications. First of all, we answer to the general call for more 
research on the accounting for JCEs in order to provide an accurate understanding 
supporting investors who must interpret financial statement numbers while making 
economic decisions. This is an important research theme as various stakeholders rely, 
to some extent, on publicly available accounting information for their decision-
making. Second, we add knowledge on the accounting choice literature bringing 
evidence on the extent to which managers exercise discretion to improve their wealth 
or mitigate conflicts of interests among contracting parties. Our result suggests that, in 
the Italian context, managers may select accounting methods to decrease political costs, 
as well as to increase profitability and their own compensation. Third, we provide an 
original extension of the contracting-based theory and enlarge the accounting choice 
literature by testing some governance variables, besides those usually employed for 
the debt covenant and the political cost hypothesis. Moreover, we complement the few 
previous research on determinants of accounting choices, formulating hypotheses in 
terms of profitability and leverage ratios. Thereby, we fill a gap in the empirical 
researches on the accounting choices, providing evidence that dominant shareholders, 
use of corporate bonds and family influence systematically affect the choice of the 
Equity method for the accounting of JCEs in the Italian setting. In addition, the current 
study is unique in that we are among the first testing a variable related to the use of 
public debt, as a proxy for political visibility, to explain the choice of accounting 
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principles.  
With regard to the contributions for practitioners and policy makers, we address the 
international standard setting debate by providing results that witness the managerial 
opportunism in the accounting for JCEs by the Equity method.  
Our research sheds light on the role played by the Equity method as an additional tools 
in the hands of powerful managers to opportunistically increase their wealth. These 
empirical findings are likely to be of general interest for continental Europe and other 
countries with family involvement and large block holders, since concentrated 
ownership is a norm rather than an exception around the world. Our findings have 
important policy implications for regulators since they support the opinion that the 
demonstrated dependence of the Equity method choice on firm’s specific factors 
should raise doubts about the general application  of an Anglo-Saxon accounting 
model to a continental European institutional setting. In this perspective, and in view 
of the recent introduction of IFRS 11, our paper provide evidence that might be useful 
for the assessment of the IASB decision to eliminate the Proportionate consolidation. 
However, when drawing these conclusions, we acknowledge that our results come 
with certain limitations and potential caveats for future research. First, because our 
results are focused on Italy and on the period 2008–2012, both country and time 
period are limitations of this study. Second, we believe that a larger sample size could 
strengthen results even if such a sample is about the entire population examined. 
Further research might extend to other countries and periods, also in view of an 
enlargement of the sample size. Third, the paper lacks empirical evidence on the 
increase in managerial wealth. Thus, there would be further research potential in 
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empirically testing the managerial opportunism through the bonus plan hypothesis. 
Likely, further investigation carried out on inside and outside ownership would be 
helpful for generalizing our conclusions.  
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Conclusions 
 
This Thesis has concentrated on the critical topic of the accounting treatment for 
JCEs. 
Starting from a detailed literature review on the accounting comparability and 
accounting choices, the elaborate has analyzed the accounting convergence for the 
consolidation of interests in JCEs using the Equity method or the Proportionate 
consolidation and has investigated the factors that influence managers’ decision to 
reporting one of the two alternative methods under IAS 31.  Despite each chapter has 
focused on the same subject, different research questions, methodologies, theoretical 
frameworks have been implemented. 
The relevance of this topic is concerned with the relevance of  the theoretical and 
empirical debate on the appropriate accounting method prescribed by IAS 31 
(Kothavala, 2003; Lim et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2003; Stoltzfus & Epps, 2005; 
Soonawalla, 2006; Bauman, 2007, Lourenço & Curto, 2010; Giner & Veron, 2012) and 
with the impact on the financial consolidated statement deriving by the recent issue of 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standard) 11, Joint Arrangements, which 
removes the multiple accounting options, in prescribing merely the Equity method to 
increase comparability within IFRS and convergence with US GAAP.  
To address these issues research studies which employed quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies are performed and focused on the Italian Market.  The Italian setting is 
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used since some of its features make it the research specifically suitable. (Catuogno & 
Allini, 2011; Di Pietra et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2013). 
In each chapter the arguments have provided a relevant contribution for academics 
and practitioners. 
In the first chapter a review of the principal studies on JCEs has been conducted. In 
the literature three theoretical approaches are used to explain the motivation and the 
choice of JCEs: the Theory of Transaction Costs (Williamson, 1975,1985); Strategic 
Behavior Theory (Kogut, 1989); Organizational Knowledge and Learning Theory 
(Polanyi,  1967). According to Williamson, the firms choose to how the transact to 
minimize the sum of production and transaction costs. A necessary condition to prefer 
the JCEs to internal development or acquisition, is that the production costs achieved 
through this structures are much higher than external sourcing for at least one of the 
partners. Under the Strategic Behavior Theory, the companies transact to maximize 
profits, through improving a firm’s competitive position facing the rivals. In 
particular, the strategic behavior, explains how competitive positioning influences the 
asset value of the firms. In this circumstances the creation of the JCEs avoids the 
costly duplication among companies but preserves the competition generating a 
welfare-improving. The Organizational Knowledge and Learning Theory view the 
JCEs as a means by which companies learn or retain their knowledge, in practice the 
JCEs are vehicles by which tacit knowledge is transferred (Polanyi,  1967), under the 
assumption that the very knowledge is organizationally embedded.  
Secondly, is faced the JCEs accounting issue, in particular, the convergence process 
steps for their accounting treatment.  
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The chapter ends with a summary of previous empirical findings on JCEs, divided 
into two broad categories:  Effects and Determinants of the use of Equity or 
Proportionate. Previous literature mainly focused on the market consequences 
deriving from the alternative reporting method, although providing mixed evidence. 
Few studies show that Equity method statements is associated with superior risk 
relevance in explaining bond ratings but not price volatility (Kothavala, 2003) and 
decline in information asymmetry (Lim et al., 2003). Differently a greater number of 
empirical results highlight that Proportionate consolidation presents a more 
comprehensive view of the venturer financial position and of its incumbent risks and 
rewards, appears more useful in predicting future returns on shareholders (Graham et 
al., 2003), provides creditors with better information, when the venturer guarantees 
the JCEs's debts (Stoltzfus & Epps, 2005) and avoids the lost of forecasting and 
relevant information (Soonawalla, 2006; Bauman, 2007). More recently, Lourenço et 
al. (2012) show that the elimination of the Proportionate consolidation would deprive 
investors of a set of information on recognized assets and liabilities, which might be 
not comparable to the information presented in the notes.  
Differently, relatively little attention has been dedicated to the determinants for the 
accounting treatments of JCEs. Lourenço and Curto (2010) provide evidence that an 
organizational determinant plays an important role in the management decision to 
report JCEs. They find out that, in the UK context, the type Link influences the 
management choice to use the Proportionate consolidation. Later, Giner and Veron 
(2012) report that the interdependence of the activities between the entities, the 
assets specificity and the firms’ size are positively associated with the adoption of the 
Conclusions 
131 
 
Proportionate method in Spanish firms, while leverage is negatively associated.  
 It is possible to conclude that there is still very poor literature on the determinants 
behind the managerial choice. 
The second chapter has analyzed the accounting convergence in the reporting for 
interests in JCEs using the Equity method or the Proportionate consolidation and has 
explored some of the determinants that could explain the application of the 
accounting consolidation method selected.  
First of all the accounting convergence has been measured applying the van der Tas 
Herfindahl H index, (van der Tas, 1988). In order to understand which one of the two 
consolidation methods is preferred  in practice, the degree of harmonization and 
comparability has been tested. 
Evidences provide that, during the observed period, almost 50% of the Italian groups 
chose the Equity method, despite the IASB recommended the Proportionate 
consolidation in IAS 31, which better reflects the economic substance of the interests 
in JCEs. Consistent with literature (Zeff, 2007)  the findings document that the 
convergence in Italy still remains at a medium level. 
After measured  the accounting convergence, assuming that the Equity method 
improves some Key Performance Indicators (Return on Assets, Leverage, Profit 
Margin) (Graham et al., 2001) the research has observed if the market is indirectly 
affected by the lack of accounting convergence practice and rewards firms applying 
Equity method with better key performance indicators. Has been observed the Price 
Earning distribution (P/E) - as a measure of firm’s investors reputation -  associated 
with the application of each accounting method required by IAS 31 (Darryl et 
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al.,1987). The results show that the lack of convergence does not affect the value of 
P/E ratio, since the market seems not to reward companies applying the Equity 
method. 
Finally an exploratory research design has been adopted, the  Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA), (Ghauri et al., 1995) based on two parameters: 
1) Price/Earnings (as a measure of firm’s investors reputation), (Little, 1999); 
2)  Method of consolidation for JCEs (Equity or Proportionate); 
with the aim to  investigate the existence of latent variables that could explain the 
accounting choices for the consolidation of JCEs. 
The findings suggest a correlation between the accounting choices for JCEs and the 
firm’s creditworthiness. 
From the point of view of the thesis, this chapter has allowed to evidence that, 
consistently with both the characteristics of the Italian financial market – which is 
mainly credit oriented – and with the typical ownership structure – which is mostly 
concentrated or family owned -, the market reputation, from the investor’s 
perspective, does not play a relevant role in the accounting choices as instead the 
firm’s creditworthiness does.  
The third chapter has been framed in  the contracting-based theory, and has mainly 
focused determinants (leverage, corporate bond, size, dominant shareholder and 
family influence), behind the choice of Equity method for the accounting of JCEs in 
Italy, as the opportunistic accounting technique that improves firm’s leverage and 
profitability.  
An explanatory model has been developed following the theoretical framework 
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derived from the accounting choice theory, where contractual efficiency and 
managerial opportunism reasons could explain the choice of the Equity method. A 
mixed-effects logistic model has been used, which takes into account the Equity 
method as a baseline outcome category. 
The empirical findings highlight that the monitoring role played by dominant 
shareholders, as well as by bondholders and related market authorities, limits the 
managerial opportunism in the adoption of the Equity method for the accounting of 
JCEs, whereas the growing family influence fosters the selection of the performance-
improving accounting technique. Conversely, neither leverage nor size seems to 
influence the choice, revealing the irrelevance of the usual relations in the Italian 
context.  
This study  provides several contributions to the accounting choice literature and has 
a number of theoretical implications.  The results  add knowledge on the accounting 
choice literature bringing evidence on the extent to which managers exercise 
discretion to improve their wealth or mitigate conflicts of interests among contracting 
parties. The finding suggests that, in the Italian context, managers may select 
accounting methods to decrease political costs, as well as to increase profitability and 
their own compensation. In addition has been provided an original extension of the 
contracting-based theory and enlarge the accounting choice literature by testing some 
governance variables, besides those usually employed for the debt covenant and the 
political cost hypothesis.  
With regard to the contributions for practitioners and policy makers, has been 
addressed  the international standard setting debate by providing results that witness 
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the managerial opportunism in the accounting for JCEs by the Equity method.  
The  findings have important policy implications for regulators since they support the 
opinion that the demonstrated dependence of the Equity method choice on firm’s 
specific factors should raise doubts about the general application  of an Anglo-Saxon 
accounting model to a continental European institutional setting. In this perspective, 
and in view of the recent introduction of IFRS 11, the analysis provides evidence that 
might be useful for the assessment of the IASB decision to eliminate the Proportionate 
consolidation. 
 
In conclusion the three chapters have been structured as a specific research design,  in 
terms of research question, methodology and theoretical approach, and also their 
implications and contributions differently advance the research and the practice. The 
overall research design has been represented as a whole. The thesis advances the 
research on the accounting choices by providing new results that support previous 
evidences but within new context that are characterized by particular features. These 
aspects, combined with the limitations that each research presents, have provided 
new insights and implications for future research. 
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